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IMPACT OF THE COURTS UPON THE NRA PROGRAM:
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF NIRA
AN abundant literature in both legal' and lay2 periodicals has attempted,
with diverse results, to predict the constitutional status of the NRA program.
Two cases presently to be considered by the Supreme Court3 may draw forth
final judicial determination of some aspects of the question, although recent
developments seem likely to allow decision on other grounds 4 Meanwhile,
1. See, e.g., Black, National Industrial Recovery Act and the Delegation of Legislative
Power to the President (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 389; Carpenter, Constitutionality of the
National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1934) 7 So. CA i.
L. REv. 125; Elder, Some Constitutional Aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(1934) 28 ILL. L. Ra,. 636; Field, Constitutional Theory of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act (1934) 18 MrNmN. L. Rav. 269.
2. See, e.g., Arnold, New Deal is Constitutional (1933) 77 NEw REP. 8; Clark, A
Socialistic State Under the Constitution (1934) 9 FoRTuNE 68; Cornin, Some Probable
Repercussions of Nira on our Constitutional System (1934) 172 ANN. AM. ACAD. 139;
Cummings, Recovery Plan as Constitutional Remedy (1933) 9 RE. Snir=v No. 2, at 90.
3. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, and Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Ryan, cert. granted,
U. S. L. Week, Oct. 9, 1934, at 102, Col. 1.
4. An error in amending the petroleum code, discovered since the cases were In the
lower courts, may remove from the Amazon case the question of the power to make pro-
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since the beginning of administrative action under the Act, a considerable num-
ber of lower courts have been required to discuss various features of the re-
covery scheme based on the National Industrial Recovery Act. The contact
of the courts with the tremendous program involved has been interesting not
only to indicate judicial attitude toward the fundamental purpose of the Act,
but likewise to indicate the type of question most likely to arise and perhaps
therefore to focus attention and consideration upon more real issues than hitherto
has been possible. Moreover, regardless of the eventual determination on the
constitutional issues, the reported cases reflect an active administration over
business and labor that meanwhile must have far reaching effects.
CoNsTrrUTIONALITY
It has been generally felt that, without much difficulty and with adequate
lip-service to precedent, the Act itself and much of the regulation under it
could readily be held constitutional. But the subject matter of the NRA pro-
gram is so broad that it raises a number of separate constitutional questions
that can very possibly receive different treatment from the courts. The major
points so far raised for consideration are, first, the scope of the regulatory
power of Congress under the commerce clause; second, due process as a restric-
tion on price fixing; third, the validity of Section 9(c) providing for prohibition
of shipment in interstate commerce of petroleum produced in contravention of
state law; and, fourth, the extent to which Congress may delegate legislative
power to the president. Further important questions that have not been passed
upon are the validity of the provisions for licensing in Section 4(b) and for
regulation of employer-employee relationships under Section 7(a).
An approach to the question of constitutionality must consider two aspects:
one is the Act itself; the other is conduct under the authority of the Act, pre-
scribed by the codes adopted in accordance with its terms. Thus where the
Act sets forth that it purports to regulate interstate commerce, such an inten-
tion on the part of Congress can certainly find constitutional sanction. But
the terms of the Act indicate that conduct encouraged thereby is intended to
extend governmental control further than ever before. Consequently the con-
stutionality of the NRA program depends in large part upon the validity of
particular provisions by which it is put into effect. These methods appear only
by investigation of individual codes; the invalidity of a code or some of its
provisions is no indication that the Act itself is invalid.
Although neither the power to prohibit interstate shipment by requiring
operation under a license nor the power to protect labor by guaranteeing the
right to collective bargaining and by abolishing the yellow-dog contract has
been judicially determined, the questions have been largely discussed by com-
mentators. As to the power to license, it has been argued that such a power
to prohibit has long been considered a part of the power to regulate and that
duction of petroleum in excess of the State quotas an unfair trade practice, and the ques-
tion of the power to prohibit shipments of "hot oil" in interstate commerce may ha
dismissed as moot, the regulations having been amended since the suits were instituted.
U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at S7, col. 3.
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licensing should easily be sustained.5 And without deciding the validity of the
labor provisions, courts have entertained damage suits by employers and have
enjoined employers from interfering with employee rights, both under the
President's Reemployment Agreement and under the sanction of code provl-
sions.6
Scope of the Commerce Clause. A fundamental purpose of the Recovery
Act is to subject to minute restrictions as many kinds of business as possible.
The questions naturally arise, then, as to how far such regulation may extend
to businesses not directly concerned with interstate commerce as such, and
what forms of control may be exercised within the field subject to the exercise
of the power. The Supreme Court has previously held that the power of Con-
gress to regulate commerce does extend to local matters which, though not them-
selves a part of it, are inextricably intermingled with interstate commerce or
so closely related thereto as to make their regulation essential to the effective
regulation of interstate commerce.7 The restriction on this power has been
only that the relation to interstate commerce must be "direct and substantial,"
not merely "accidental, secondary, remote, and problematical," a vague enough
test, surely, and one which leaves wide room for judicial discretion. Conse-
quently, when by the terms of the NIRA Congress purports to regulate "trans-
actions in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce," attack can not well
be directed against the Act, but only against particular regulation attempted
thereunder.
As reflected in the codes, many of the attempts at regulation are similar to
previous attempts that have been declared unconstitutional. In attempting to
regulate prices, wages, hours of labor, and production the codes are exerting
over manufacturing and producing processes a confining control hitherto de-
clared impossible where the only connection with interstate commerce has been
the fact that the product was eventually to be shipped in such commerce.0
S. Carpenter, supra note 1, at 140; Field, Supra note 1, at 279; Corwin Congress's
Power to Prohibit Commerce a Crucial Constitutional Issue (1933) 18 Come. L. Q. 477.
6. See the section on labor, infra.
7. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895); Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U. S. 211 (1899); Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904);
Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905); Loewe v, Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274
(1908); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912); Minnesota Rate Caes,
230 U. S. 352 (1913); Houston, East and West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234
U. S. 342 (1914); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915); Wilson v. New, 243 U. S.
332 (1917); Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921); Railroad Comm ilon
of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Rr. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); Stafford
v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923);
Colorado v. 'United States, 271 U. S. 153 (1926); Tagg Brothers and Moorhead v. United
States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930).
8. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922);
United Leather Workers' Industrial Union v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (1924); Industrial
Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 64 (1925); Levering and Garrigues Co. v. Morrln,
289 U. S. 103 (1933).
9. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895); Delaware, Lackawanna
and Western Rr. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439 (1915); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U. S. 251 (1918).
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This regulation is now sought to be justified upon different grounds, as indi-
cated in the Congressional declaration of policy.' 0 It is there stated to be the
desire of Congress to remove obstructions to the free flow of interstate com-
merce by eradicating the causes of the depression. Thus an attempt is made
to shift from physical connection with interstate commerce to the less tangible
ground of economic connection. And if this premise be accepted, then it would
follow that whatever may factually be said to have contributed to the depres-
sion should be subject to federal regulation until the period of economic stress
has ended. Thus the picture is presented of local industry as a subject for
state control when national prosperity reigns, and federal control during
periods of emergency. Conceivably the state of our economic development
might be found to be such that a permanent rather than transitory federal
control would be permissible under this theory.
In cases that have arisen under the Act some judges have avoided this vital
question by finding from the facts a physical connection with interstate com-
merce. Thus where a cleaner had his plant in New Jersey but sold his services
in New York, he was held to be actually engaged in interstate commerce."
Again, where advertisements were placed in a newspaper of interstate circula-
lion and a sale to a customer from another state was proved, the evidence
clearly established a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce."
On the other hand, it has been bluntly said that Congress cannot regulate manu-
facture or production, any effect on interstate commerce being simply ignored.3
Six courts, however, have given full consideration to the theory of economic
effect on interstate commerce and have divided equally in result. Thus viola-
tions of the wage, hours of labor, and other provisions of the live poultry code
were held to disrupt the free flow of interstate commerce and therefore to have
a direct and substantial effect on that commerce; 14 exceeding the restriction of
operations in hosiery mills to two forty-hour shifts per week was found to affect
interstate commerce substantially;' 0 and the practice by operators of filling
stations in Detroit of giving coupons redeemable in merchandise with sales of
gasoline products was held directly to burden and substantially to obstruct
the free flow of interstate commerce in petroleum products.'0 But two cases
held that the giving of premiums in connection with the sale of petroleum
products had at most only a "merely accidental, secondary, remote, and prob-
10. NIRA, § 1; see Field, supra note 1, at 270 et seq.
11. United States v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners, 6 F. Supp. 725 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
12. United States v. Canfield Lumber Co., U. S. L. Week, Sept. 18, 1934, at 46, col. 2
(D. Neb. 1934).
I3. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 5 F. Supp. 639 (E. D. Tex. 1934), rev'd, 71 F.
(2d) 8, sub. nom. Ryan v. Panama Refining Co. (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); United States v.
Lieto, 6 F. Supp. 32 (N. D. Tex. 1934); Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16
(W. D. Ky. 1934); United States v. Eason Oil Co., U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 83,
col 1 (W. D. Okla. 1934).
14. United States v. Schechter, U. S. L. Week, Sept. 4, 1934, at 17, col. 2 (E. D.
N. Y. 1934).
15. Richmond Hosiery AiMls v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. 139 (N. D. Ga. 1934).
16. Victor v. Ickes, 61 Wash. L. Rep. 870 (D. C. 1933).
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lematical" effect on interstate commerce; 17 and the price at which coal was
sold at a wagon mine or the desultory production of the mine even though
sales to some who took the coal across State lines were proved, was held not
to affect interstate commerce in the way and to the extent necessary to justify
federal regulation. 18 The facts of these six cases are close enough to draw
attention to what will probably prove to be the most important question need-
ing authoritative settlement, that is, whether Congress has the power to regu-
late transactions which it considers as causative of the depression and there-
fore of the derangement of interstate commerce.
In addition to the necessity for some affirmative argument to justify federal
control over matters heretofore considered as of a local nature only, the neces-
sity has arisen in certain types of cases, notably those involving restriction
of production, to distinguish precedents which appear to foreclose that particular
form of regulation.
It has already been pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that manu-
facture and production, since they are not commerce, cannot be regulated under
the commerce power when the only basis for regulation is that the goods are
destined for interstate commerce. Nevertheless, restrictions in production
output are a vital factor in many of the codes, and only in cases arising under
the petroleum code' 9 has the obstacle of previous decisions proved insurmount-
able to the courts.20  But the restriction of production provisions have been
upheld with respect to the lumber, 21 cotton textile,22 silk textile,23 rayon silk
17. United States v. Suburban Motor Service Corp., 5 F. Supp. 798 (N. D. Il. 1934);
United States v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1934).
18. United States v. Gearhart, U. S. L. Week, August 14, 1934, at 1043, col. I (D.
Colo. 1934).
19. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 5 F. Supp. 639 (E. D. Tex. 1934); United States
v. Smith, The Blue Eagle, Sept. 4, 1934, at 4, col. 2 (E. D. Tex. 1934); United States v.
Eason Oil Co., U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 83, col. 1 (W. D. Okla. 1934).
20. It is true that the Supreme Court had previously held that oil production was not
so intimately connected with interstate commerce that state regulation of the former con-
stituted an undue burden upon the latter. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com-
mission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932). Thus a lower court might now hesitate to hold that
the same process did have such a connection with interstate commerce as to bring It
within the scope of the commerce clause. But certainly there is no compelling reason
why a court should so hesitate; there are several fields in which the state is competent
to regulate without burdening interstate commerce unduly which are yet closely enough
connected with interstate commerce to permit of federal regulation as well. E.g., Hous-
ton, East and West Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914) (complementary
state and federal control over intrastate railroad rates); Thornton v. United States,
271 U. S. 414 (1926) (complementary state and federal control over diseased intrastate
cattle).
21. Willamette Valley Lumber Co. v. Watzek, 5 F. Supp. 689 (D. Ore. 1934).
22. United States v. Greenville Finishing Co., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 4, 1934, at 4, col. 1
(D. R.I. 1934).
23. United States v. Salzberg and Sons, U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 74, Col. 3
(D. R. I. 1934).
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dyeing and printing,24 and hosiery2 5 codes where the courts have accepted
the theory that economic effect on interstate commerce gave the necessary rela-
tion for regulation under the commercial clause. A difficult subordinate prob-
lem arising here concerns the equitable allocation of production quotas, and
it has been held that, although due process requires the fairest allocation prac-
ticable, administrative difficulty obviates the necessity of considering such
matters as past productive history and existing contract obligations.2
Due Process. Further adverse precedent is encountered when an attempt
is made to fix prices. There is a long series of cases, beginning with Munn v.
Illinois26 and continuing unbroken to the O'Gorman and Young- insurance
case, establishing affectation with a public interest as the criterion of the
validity of price and rate regulation. But this line of cases has been demon-
strated to be founded upon historical error.2 In the Nebbia casem the Supreme
Court went out of its way to recognize this false basis, saying that the test
means nothing more than that a business must be subject to regulation under
the police power in order to be affected with a public interest and explaining
the cases holding such regulations invalid as based upon the arbitrary charac-
ter of the regulations under conditions then existing rather than upon the
nature of the business. Furthermore, in the past, price-fixing has usually been
a legislative attempt to reduce prices for the protection of the consumer; the
NRA program attempts to increase and maintain, rather than to reduce, prices
for the purpose of protecting industry from the devastation of price wars
so prevalent under the system of free competition. To support the present provi-
sions it is contended that Congress has the power to regulate methods of
competition in interstate commerce and that under existing conditions price
cutting is a method of unfair competition to be avoided only by governmental
price control. The case so far arising under the NRA have almost uniformly
upheld that right thus to fix prices, either on the theory that it is justified
by emergency 0 or with no discussion at all.31 And even where the power has
24. United States v. Allied Dye and Print Works, Inc., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 4, 1934,
at 4, col. 1 (D. N. J. 1934).
25. Richmond Hosiery AM v. Camp, 7 F. Supp. 139 (N. D. Ga. 1934).
26. 94 U. S. 113 (1877).
27. 282 U. S. 251 (1931). See also, Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927); Ribaik
v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928); Wlliams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1929).
See Elder, supra note 1, at 640.
28. Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest (1930) 39 YAX= L. J. 1039.
29. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 531 (1934).
30. United States v. Spotless Dollar Cleaners, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 72S (S. D. N. Y. 1934);
Hoskins v. Gullatt Cleaning & Laundry Co., U. S. L. Week, April 3, 1934, at 6S2, col. 2
(C. P., Franklin Co., Ohio 1934) (State act).
31. United States v. Blue Ribbon Corp., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934, at 4, col. 3
(W. D. Ark. 1934) (consent decree); United States v. James W. McAllister, Inc, U. S. L.
Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 89, col. 3 (N. D. Cal. 1934); United States v. Barnhill, The Blue
Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934, at 4, col. 1, (S. D. Ga. 1934) (guilty plea); United States v. Tung
The Blue Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934, at 4, col. 2 (E. D. L.a. 1934); United States v. Howard's
Odorless Cleaners, Inc., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934, at 4, col. 3 (E. D. La. 1934);
United States v. Truckers Ice and Cold Storage Co., Ltd., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934,
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been said to be inapplicable to a business because the requisite interstate char-
acter was lacking,32 this defect has been successfully met when a state recovery
act supplementing the terms of the National Act has been in force.8 3 But a
check on the operation of the power is to some extent preserved in the kequire-
ment that for valid price control the authority must act in good faith,84 avoid-
ing arbitrary and unfair discrimination. 5 Only in one instance has a court
denied that price cutting was an unfair method of competition under present
day conditions and consequently reached the conclusion that price fixing was
therefore unwarranted.80
Prohibition of Shipment of Petroleum Illegally Produced. Only the dis-
credited case of Hammer v. Dagenhart" stands in the way of a holding that
the power to regulate commerce includes the power to prohibit shipments in
that commerce of an article produced in contravention to the laws of the
state of production. That case may be distinguished on the ground that
the fatal defect of the law there declared invalid was not that prohibition
was an improper form of regulation of interstate commerce, but that the
law was primarily a regulation of manufacture. Under the NIRA, however,
the primary purpose is the stimulation of interstate commerce, and so the
question seems to be not one of the scope of the commerce clause, but one
of the validity of the prohibition as a reasonable form of regulation under the
Fifth Amendment. There are precedents holding that prohibition is proper
at 4, col. 2 (E. D. La. 1934); United States v. Howard's Odorless Cleaners, Inc., The
Blue Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934, at 4, col. 3 (W. D. La. 1934); United States v. Divine, U. S. L.
Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 89, col. 2 (D. Neb. 1934); United States v. C. H. Joyner Chevrolet
Co., U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 89, col. 2 (M. D. N. C. 1934) (consent decree);
New Jersey v. Magid, 2 NRA Rep. 174 (Ct. Quart. Sess. Jersey City, N. J. 1934) (State
act); Stokes v. Newton Creek Coal and Coke Co., U. S. L. Week, Sept. 18, 1934, at 47,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1934) (State act); State v. Riesenberg, U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2,
1934, at 88, col. 2 (Mag. Ct., Millcreek Twp., Hamilton Co., Ohio 1934) (State act);
Brady v. Lewis, U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 89, col. 1 (Circ. Ct., Roanoke Co., Va.
1934) (State act); cf. U. S. L. Week, Oct. 16, 1934, at 109, col. 3.
32. Purvis v. Bazemore, 5 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. Fla. 1933); United States v. Gear-
hart, U. S. L. Week, Aug. 14, 1934, at 1043, col. 1 (D. Colo. 1934); People of State of
California v. Economy Cleaners, U. S. L. Week, April 10, 1934, at 696, col. 1 (Super.
Ct., Santa Clara Co., Cal. 1934).
33. New Jersey v. Magid, 2 NRA Rep. 174 (Ct. Quart. Sess., Jersey City, N. J. 1934);
Stokes v. Newton Creek Coal and Coke Co., U. S. L. Week, Sept. 18, 1934, at 47, col, I
Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1934); State v. Riesenberg, U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 88, col. 2
(Mag. Ct., Millcreek Twp., Hamilton Co., Ohio 1934); Brady v. Lewis, U. S. L. Week,
Oct. 2, 1934, at 89, col. 1 (Circ. Ct., Roanoke Co., Va. 1934).
34. Stokes v. Newton Creek Coal and Coke Co., U. S. L. Week, Sept. 18, 1934, at 41,
coL 1 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1934).
35. Woodward Iron Co. v. Adams, U. S. L. Week, Aug. 21, 1934, at 1049, col, 1 (N.
D. Ala. 1934); Hoskins v. Gullatt Cleaning and Laundry Co., U. S. L. Week, April 3,
1934, at 682, col. 2 (C. P., Franklin Co., Ohio 1934).
36. State v. Gullatt Cleaning and Garment Co., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934, at 4,
col. 2 (C. P. Ct., Hamilton Co., Ohio 1934).
37. 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
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as an aid to a valid policy of the state of destination 3s or to prevent the
spread of evil. 9  If the economic effect of price reduction through overpro-
duction is considered, these cases furnish a strong analogy. But closer still
is the case of Brooks v. United States,40 upholding the law making transporta-
tion of stolen automobiles in interstate commerce a crime, as it seems to hold
that Congress may reenforce the policy of the State of origin by prohibiting
interstate commerce in a commodity banned by the law of that state. It is
this power whose validity is called into question in the two cases now pending
in the Supreme Court. The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the provision as
being a regulation of commerce rather than of production, although it sup-
plemented and aided the state law regulating production.4 '
Delegation of Power. The problem of delegation of legislative powers to
the President, though concededly serious, seems to be the least important of
the constitutional considerations. There is no constitutional provision pro-
hibiting the delegation of legislative powers, but it is deemed to be implicit in
the doctrine of separation of powers, which is said to be embodied in the
Constitution. And it is sometimes also said that the grant of power to one
implies a prohibition of its exercise by another. The dialectic is that if the
Congress provides a primary standard for the guidance of the enxecutive, it
may delegate the power to issue administrative rules and regulations which
will tend to effectuate the policy expressed by the primary standard; something
to guide the administrator is said to be essential. The suggestion has been
made that the true rule is that Congress must be as definite and detailed as
the practicality of the situation will allow and that the degree of power that
can be delegated will thus vary with the subject riatter of the legislation. In
any event, the Supreme Court has never held an act of Congress unconstitu-
tional on this ground,43 and the lower courts have ber-n reluctant to say that
there is an unwarranted delegation of power by the Act. Several judges have
indicated that they thought the delegation excessive, but none have been
willing to make an outright holding to that effect.
44
PRocEDURE
Three procedural questions have confronted the courts in their interpreta-
tion of the NIRA; namely, who can sue under the act either to prevent or
38. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891); Clark Distilling Co. v. Wetern Maryland
Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (1917); United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (1919).
39. Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States
220 U. S. 45 (1911); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 303 (1913); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U. S. 470 (1917).
40. 267 U. S. 432 (1925); see Field, supra note 1, at 286.
41. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Ryan v.
Panama Refining Co., 71 F. (2d) 8 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
42. Black, supra note 1; Carpenter, supra note 1, at 126.
43. United States v. Suburban Motor Service Corp., 5 F. Supp. 798 (N. D. T,. 1934).
44. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 5 F. Supp. 639 (E. D. Tex. 1934); Hart Coal Corp.
v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. Ky. 1934); Irma Hat Co. v. Local Retail Code Authority
for Chicago, Inc., U. S. L. Week, Aug. 7, 1934, at 1033, col 1 (N. D. IL. 1934).
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require its enforcement, where such suits can be brought, and when it is per-
missible or advisable to bring such suits.
Who Can Sue. Where the purpose is to challenge the validity of the
act or regulations thereunder, any person whose interests are seriously affected
can bring suit.45 A general restriction on this broad privilege is found in
the requirement that the interest for which judicial protection is desired shall
be in fact "directly and seriously" affected by the act. As an example of this
requirement a federal district court considered as too remote the interest of an
employee discharged as a result of the wage, hours and production regulation
of a code, wherefor his employer was no longer able to retain the services of
all his employees. 48 Litigation may likewise be restricted by the ruling that
signers of a code are estopped from attacking its validity. In spite of a denial
of the application of this flexible doctrine in one case attacking generally the
recovery legislation and discussing particularly the coal code, 47 indications
point to an extended use of this device,48 especially where the complainants
thus foreclosed have freely accepted benefits provided by the code.
40
It is less easy to determine who can sue to enforce the act and regulations.
Clearly the Federal Trade Commission has the power to do so, for it is specifi-
cally provided in the Act that violations of the codes are deemed to be unfair
methods of competition within the purview of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.5 0 But the power thus vested in that body has not yet been exercised.
Similarly federal district attorneys are explicitly empowered to institute pro-
ceedings both to enjoin and to penalize violations of the Act or of any valid
code, and actions have occasionally been brought by these officials in the
exercise of this authority.51 Beyond this the act is silent, neither giving to nor
withholding from individuals the privilege successfully to resort to court action.
There have been two specific types of individual or private suits before the
courts for the purpose of enforcing the Recovery legislature. First, there have
been suits by individuals to take advantage of favorable regulations in the
President's Reemployment Agreement. Under the section of the NIRA giving
the President power to enter into voluntary agreements, 2 a number of con-
tracts were executed between the President and various employers whereby the
employers received the Blue Eagle in return for a promise to maintain a mini-
45. For a discussion of possible methods of attacking the NIRA, see Comment (1933)
28 Irm. L. Rv. 544.
46. Starring v. Frazer, 4 F. Supp. 818 (D. Tenn. 1933).
47. Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. Ky. 1934).
48. Courts sympathetic to the President's recovery program will probably find this a
convenient doctrine with which to bolster doubtful decisions. Thus in a suit brought
by an employee for code wages estoppel has been held a valid defense against an employer
who advertised compliance with the Petroleum Code. Laux v. Smith, U. S. L. Week, July
3, 1934, at 11, col. 2 (Mun. Ct., Marion City., Ind. 1934).
49. Cf. Fuller Cleaning and Dyeing Co. v. Morris Brickner, U. S. L. Week, May 8,
1934, at 13, col. 1 (C. P. Cuyahoga Co., Ohio 1934).
50. § 3(b).




mum wage and maximum hour scale and to permit without interference the
exercise of labor rights guaranteed by Section 7(a) of the Act. Where em-
ployees of a party to such an agreement have sued their employer to recover
the agreed wages,53 or have sued to enjoin the employer from interfering with
their right to free collective bargaining," the courts have upheld such claims
upon the theory that the agreement was a contract between the employer and
the President for the direct benefit of the workers, who may sue as third party
beneficiaries. These decisions strain somewhat the traditional contract ide-
ology;5 5 but the result seems legally permissible, since consideration to bind
the signatories can be found in the award of the Blue Eagle, the forebearance
of the President from altering the agreement and the mutual promises of other
employers to be similarly bound. 0 A second group of cases has arisen through
attempts upon the part of individuals to enforce the provisions of specific codes.
Certain of these cases deal with actions at law, and the net result of these deci-
sions is a decided split of authority on the right of individual suit. Thus em-
ployees have in general been permitted to.enforce the wage provisions set forth
in the codes,5 7 but on the other hand suits for damages brought by one competi-
tor against another for alleged code violations appear to be summarily dismissed
for lack of complainant's capacity to sue.5 s The decisions dealing with suits
for injunctions, however, have displayed complete uniformity, and the ruling
in each case has been a denial of complainant's privilege of suit.59 It seems
53. Chipa v. Regas, 2 NRA Reporter 148 (Just. Ct., Tucson, Ariz. 1933); William- v.
Rienzi Valet Co., 2 NRA Reporter 149 (Mun. Ct., Chicago, Ill. 1934); Brown v. Hunter,
2 NRA Reporter 149 (City Ct., Wichita, Kan. 1934); Bethel v. Kamas, 2 NRA Reporter
149 (C. P., Detroit, Mich. 1933); Rush v. Somers, 2 NRA Reporter 149 (C. P., D2troit,
Mich. 1933); Tedford v. Taylor, 2 NRA Reporter 16 (just. Ct., Kansas City, Mo. 1934);
Shurman v. Kieckner (Mun. Ct., N. Y. City, N. Y. 1933); Morrison v. Gentler, U. S. L.
Week, Sept. 25, 1934, at 9, col. 1 (Mun. Ct., N. Y. City, N. Y. 1934); Mes.oh v.
Schulte, 151 Misc. 750, 273 N. Y. Supp. 699 (Mun. Ct. 1934); Greleck v. Amsterdam,
U. S. L. Week, April 17, 1934, at 10, col. 2 (Mun. Ct., Phila., Pa. 1934).
54. Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 462, 163 At. 8562 (1933);
Amalgamated Workers v. Reed, The Blue Eagle, Aug. 20, 1934, at 4, col. 3 (Circ. Ct,
Milwaukee Co., Wis. 1933); Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex
Shoe Manufacturing Co. (Cir. Ct., Milwaukee Co., Wis. 1933). Note, however, the Last
decision on appeal, 256 N. W. 56 (1934).
55. Notes: (1933) 32 MRc. L. REv. 270; (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 283.
56. An able discussion of this question is found in Comment (1933) 33 Cox. L. RFv.
1394.
57. Laux v. Smith, U. S. L. Week, July 3, 1934, at 11, col. 2 (Mun. Ct, Marion City,
Ind. 1934); Laney v. Mlner Hotel Co., The Blue Eagle, Aug. 27, 1934, at 4, col. 1
(J. P., Grand Rapids, Mich. 1934); Canton v. The Palms, Inc., 152 Misc. 347 (City Ct.,
Buffalo, N. Y. 1934). Contra: Abramovitz v. Trolman, 273 N. Y. Supp. 243 (Mun.
Ct, N. Y. City, 1934).
58. National Foundry Co. v. Alabama Pipe Co, U. S. L. Weeka, Aug. 7, 1934, at 6,
col. 1 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1934).
59. Purvis v. Bazemore, 5 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. Fla. 1933); Stanley v. Peabody Coal
Co. 5 F. Supp. 612 (S. D. Ill. 1933); Western Powder Manufacturing Co. v. Interstate
Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 619 (E. D. Ill. 1934); Bookbinders' Trade Association, Inc. v.
Book Manufacturers' Institute, Inc., U. S. L. Week, Aug. 7, 1934, at 6, col. 1 (D. C. S. D.
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unfortunate that the courts should have hesitated to recognize freely the right
of individual suit to enforce the NIRA and codes, for to allow an individual
intimately connected with the daily operation of business affected by this legis-
lation to resort to court assistance upon a departure therefrom is a more direct
and effective method of enforcement than any other conceivable. Certain courts
have reasoned, however, that the specific grant by the NIRA of enforcement
power to federal district attorneys and the Federal Trade Commission indi-
cated a Congressional intention to limit such suits to those agencies alone.
To sustain this line of reasoning they have pointed out that Congress borrowed
Section 3 (c) of the Act, which gives the district attorneys the duty of enforce-
ment, from the Anti-Trust Act,60 but failed to copy other provisions from the
latter statute which gave individuals the right to institute damage suits"l and
injunctive proceedings. 62  They have moreover shown that this Section 3(c),
when part of the Anti-trust Act, had been interpreted by Supreme Court dicta
to deny the right of individual enforcement. It is interesting to note, however,
that this reasoning has been widely criticised. It is logically demonstrated
that the NIRA imposes upon business the duty of obeying code provisions, and
that this duty was imposed for the protection of employers and competitors.0 3
Attention is then called to the recognized ruling that when a statute creates a
duty of specific law observance for the benefit of a particular class, there is
likewise created a correlative right in the individuals of that benefited class
to secure fulfillment of this duty by legal action. Thus it is concluded that
competitors, employees and all individuals intended to be specially benefited
by the Recovery Act have individual rights under its provisions.04 Further
argument in favor of individual enforcement of the codes rests on the tradi-
tional right of a private party to secure injunctive relief when irreparable
injury is proven. A competitor may certainly be enjoined from code disobe-
dience when it is proven that special injury to complainant, as distinguished from
general injury to the public, has resulted from this code violation.05 Finally
N. Y. 1934); Colorado v. United Dividend Corp., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 24, 1934,
.at 2, col. 1 (Dist. Ct., Colo. 1933); Cline v. Consumers' Cooperative Gas and Oil Co.,
152 Misc. 653 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1934); cf. Chicago Flexible Shaft Co. v. Katz Drug Co.,
6 F. Supp. 193 (D. Del. 1934). But cf. Sherman v. Abeles, 150 Misc. 497, 269 N. Y.
Supp. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (granting an injunction at request of individual, on grounds
that State Recovery Act recognized this right).
60. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. § 4 (1926).
61. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1926) (providing for triple damages).
62. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 26 (1926).
63. For example, it has repeatedly been said that the NIRA was intended to protect
the honest "90%" of an industry from the unfair practices of the other "109". See the
report of the President's radio address, in N. Y. Times, May 8, 1933, at 2; Hear-
ings before Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives on H1, R. 5664,
73rd Cong., 1st Sess. (May 18-20, 1933) at 15, 74, 106.
64. Mintz, Rights of Action Under NIRA and the Codes N. Y. L. J., Oct. 10, 1934,
at 1186, col. 2, 3 (note, however, article referred to). Note also the language used In
Amalgamated Workers v. Reed, The Blue Eagle, Aug. 20, 1934, at 4, col. 3 (Cir. Ct.,
Milwaukee Co., Wis. 1933).
65. Rosenbaum, Enforcement of the NIRA and Codes By Private Injunctive Proceedings
(1934) 8 U. or Cm. L. REv. 155. Also note Mayer, A HANonooX or NRA (2d ed. 1934)
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the right of individual enforcement is established by an analysis of particular
Supreme Court decisions. It is demonstrated that Supreme Court dicta inter-
preting Section 3(c) when part of the Anti-trust Act merely denied injunctive
relief to individuals when injury to the general public was alone shown, that
lower federal courts gave injunctive relief under that act when special injury
was proven, and that repeatedly Supreme Court decisions have approved the
right of private proceedings to enforce statutes which made no provision for
this right.6 6
Where suit can be brought. Because of the present restrictions as to who
can bring suit, the questions of where these suits are to be brought does not
seem difficult. The Federal Trade Commission is required to apply to the
Circuit Court of Appeals G7 and the federal district attorneys are directed to
bring their penal or injunctive suits in federal district courts. cs And since no
provision is made for suits by individuals, neither is any restriction placed
upon their choice of courts in which to bring what suits they may be allowed
to maintain.69 But on the whole it has been in the state courts that individuals
have found what protection has been granted to them in suits against employers
under the President's Reemployment Agreement," under codesP7 and under
state recovery acts specifically providing for state court jurisdiction."'
When suits can or should be brought. The courts have addressed themselves
not only to the question of where to sue, but also to the question of prerequisites
to the right of suit. There is some danger that an individual would be re-
quired to violate a code before he could bring suit to prevent its enforcement,
12; Williams, Employee Relations Under The National Recovery Act (1933) 26 L.w.
,um B ,r . 291, 293; Note (1933) 32 AcH. L. REv. 270, 274. But cf. Comment (1934)
28 ILL. L. REV. 673, 6S5, 686.
66. Note (1934) 43 YA=. L. J. 480. It has been suggested that an individual might
secure a mandamus to compel the district attorney to institute proceedings against a code
violator. Comment (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 544, 547. But cf. Comment (1934) 28 Ir..+
L. REv. 673, 683. Likewise it has been suggested that the reasoning of the decisions
permitting individual suits to enforce the President's Reemployment Agreement could Ire ap-
plied to enforcement of codes. This contractual theory, however, would only apply where
defendants were signatories of the codes. For discussion of this question, see Comments:
(1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1394, 1401, 1402; (1934) 2 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 223, 232-235;
(1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 85, 100.
67. 38 STAT. 719 (1914) [as amended 43 STAT. 939 (1925)J, 15 U. S. C. A, § 45 (1926).
68. § 3(c): "The several district courts of the United States are hereby invested with
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of any code of fair competition approved
under this title; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United
States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute
proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations."
69. Certainly if individuals may not sue, no question of where they may sue artzes.
Colorado v. United Dividend Corp., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 24, 1934, at 2, col. 1 (DiLt. Ct.
Colo. 1933).
70. See notes 53 and 54, supra.
71. For an interpretation of the New York Recovery Act on this point, se Sherman v.
Abeles, 150 Misc. 497, 269 N. Y. Supp. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1934), alPd, 241 App. Div. 676,
269 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't, 1934). Contra: Cline v. Consumers' Cooperative Gas and
Oil Co., 152 Misc. 653 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1934).
1934]
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although no specific cases have touched on this point7 2 Certainly, however,
this prerequisite should not be essential, as the law should hardly encourage
its own disobedience, nor penalize bewildered litigants who merely desire to
know whether such law should be obeyed. Assuming a violation to be essen-
tial, one court has further held that a threat of enforcement must be shown
for otherwise no justiciable controversy exists.7 3 However, since daily penal-
ties of $500 are provided for each code violation, 4 and since these cumulative
penalties might assume gigantic proportions before enforcement is threatened,
it would seem that a court of equity should take jurisdiction and pass upon
the validity of the regulation at once in order to prevent irreparable injury
in the form of penalties, which might have to be paid by the violator as
the result of his disbelief in the validity of the untested legislation. Finally,
again assuming that code violation is a prerequisite to the commencement
of a test case, the question of the wisdom of taking immediate action, rather
than waiting until a test case is raised by another party, is 'presented. A
federal district court has raised the question of whether only a wealthy or
helplessly bankrupt individual can afford to seek to enjoin the enforcement
of a code provision, in view of the accumulation of the NIRA and code pen-
alties during litigation.75 Two factors induce the belief that even if a regu-
lation cannot be tested without violation a complainant may safely risk an
immediate equitable suit when brought in good faith without fear of being
subject to an exhorbitant accumulation of penalties. One is that the courts
in penal actions are not bound to impose the maximum daily fine of $500,
but may reduce it to a lower figure at their discretion; the other is that
it has been held that a court of equity in such event may suspend the penal
provisions of legislation for the duration of equitable proceedings contesting
the validity of that legislation.70 Neither code violation nor threats of enforce-
ment, however, would appear to give sufficient grounds for an adjudication of
code provisions if there are still administrative proceedings open to com-
plainant which have not been pursued to a final conclusion. But it has been
held that only such administrative remedies as are actually provided by the
Recovery legislation must be exhausted,7 7 thus an informal appeal and rejec-
72. The decision cited in note 73 considers a threat of enforcement to be a prerequisite
to the right to contest the validity of a code. To secure such a threat, however, there
must be a code violation, and thus by implication a violation is required before suit
may be brought. Note also that a violation is thought necessary to test the validity of
legislation in Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 145, 146 (1908).
73. Budd v. Straus, U. S. L. Week, July 17, 1934, at 11, col. 2 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
74. § 3(f): "When a code of fair competition has been approved or prescribed by the
President under this title, any violation of any provision thereof in any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof an offender shall be fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such
violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense."
75. Willamette Valley Lumber Co. v. Watzek, 5 F. Supp. 689 (D. Ore. 1934).
76. Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 827.
77. The Recovery Administration has provided numerous code authorities, compliance
directors and arbitration boards for the handling of code disputes. A discussion of these
agencies is found in Comment (1934) 28 IL.. L. REv. 673.
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tion by the Code Authority is sufficient when no formal appeal has been pro-
vided for.
78
Fewer prerequisites to the right of suit are recognized as essential in pro-
ceedings brought to enforce the NIRA and codes. The Federal Trade Com-
mission and the federal district attorneys may commence penal and injunctive
proceedings against code violators whenever such action seems to them advis-
able. Likewise, individual suits to enforce the President's Reemployment
Agreement may be brought without technical preliminaries. Proceedings insti-
tuted by individuals against code violators, however, if recognized as per-
missible, may only be commenced upon an exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies similar to that required of a party contesting the validity of the recovery
legislation. Thus injunctions have been repeatedly denied in labor disputes
on the partial grounds that complainants had not availed themselves of the
facilities afforded by labor boards established to handle such disputes.o This
application of the doctrine of administrative remedies to individuals enforcing,
as distinguished from indivduals attacking, legislation is novel but it accords
with the purpose of the doctrine which is to relieve the courts of litigation and
appears to receive legal periodical approval s0 Certainly some such device is
essential if the individual's right to enforce the recovery legislation is recog-
nized, to curtail the flood of potential code litigation; 8 ' and it may well be
that the application of this doctrine will also prove beneficial in promoting




The Provisions of the codes are declared by the NIRA to be the standards
of fair competition for the particular trades or industries or subdivisions thereof
to which they are applicable. Any violation of these standards in a transaction
in or affecting interstate commerce constitutes an unfair method of competi-
tion.83 Congressional prohibition of such practices has been familiar since the
adoption of the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1914,84 but heretofore there
has been no previously constituted set of standards, other than that supplied
78. Woodward Iron Co. v. Adams, U. S. L. Week, Aug. 21, 1934, at S, col. 1 (N. D.
Ala. 1934); cf. Sherman v. Abeles, 150 Misc. 497, 269 N. Y. Supp. 849 (Sup. Ct.
1934) (reargument) aff'd, 241 App. Div. 676, 269 N. Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't, 1934).
79. Western Powder Manufacturing Co. v. Interstate Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 619 (E. D.
Ill. 1934); Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co., S F. Supp. 612 (S. D. Ill. 1933); cf. Fuller
Cleaning and Dyeing Co. v. Morris Brickner, U. S. L. Week, May 8, 1934, at 13, col. 1
(C. P., Cuyahoga Co., Ohio 1934).
80. Note (1934) 43 YAnE L. J. 480.
81. Of 100 questions presented to the NRA, 95 can be settled by arbitration or studies
apart from legal technicalities. N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1934, at 6, col 1 (quoting the
President).
82. Comment (1934) 43 YAL.E L. J. 599, 605, 605. Voluntary arbitration agreements
providing for resort to NRA agencies are binding. Farulla v. R. A. FreundUch, Inc, U. S.
L. Week, Sept. 4, 1934, at 18, col. 2 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1934).
83. Section 3(b).
84. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. 41-51.
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by the common law, for determining what is a fair or an unfair method of com-
petition. Congress deliberately refused to define the term, preferring that the
concept should be given content by the Commission by a gradual process in its
handling of individual cases,85 a policy resulting in an uncertainty which sug-
gested the desirability of some sort of predetermination of the lawfulness of
questionable practices.8 6  Furthermore, enforcement of the Federal Trade
Commission Act proved inadequate.87 The codes are an apparent advance
in that they attempt to meet the objections of uncertainty and unenforceability.
The standards are definitely expressed in the codes, and violations may be
more easily detected and punished. Whereas formerly judicial proceedings
against parties engaging in ruinous competitive practices were delayed until
after a hearing by the Federal Trade Commission,88 now action may be imme-
diately taken against unfair competitors, their conduct compared with code
provisions, and fines or injunctions imposed.89 Thus it is a simple matter to
secure prompt convictions for making sales below cost in violation of code
provisions.90 More effective enforcement may result also from the fact that
code standards of fair competition find more ready acceptance by the courts
than have the rulings of the Commission. In the operation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act the courts always reserved for themselves the determina-
tion of what constitutes an unfair method of competition, with an unnecessary
reverence for the common law precedents, at the expense of administrative effi-
ciency.91 But the courts have signally failed to hold a code provision void
on the ground that the practice forbidden was not an unfair method of com-
petition. 92  When there has been a desire to avoid the question of the validity
of code standards, however, defendants displaying the Blue Eagle of adver-
tising compliance with the NIRA have been convicted for violation of the codes
85. Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29 YA. n L. J, 1, at 3.
86. Watkins, An Appraisal of the Work of the Federal Trade Commission (1932) 32
CoL. L. REV. 272, at 283.
87. Wahrenbrock, Federal Anti-Trust Law and the National Industrial Recovery Act
(1933) 31 Mcir. L. REV. 1009, at 1018.
88. Peycke, The Federal Trade Commission (1922) 7 Minm. L. REv. 11, at 18.
89. These sanctions are in addition to those available under the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.
90. United States v. Canfield Lumber Co., U. S. L. Week, Sept. 18, 1934, at 46, col. 2
(D. Neb. 1934); State of Utah v. Marthakis, U. S. L. Week, Jan. 16, 1934, at 408, col. 2
(Dist Ct., Utah 1933) (State act).
91. Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Federal Trade Commission (1927)
4 Wis. L. REV. 257, at 281.
92. There has been a split of authority over the validity of the anti-premium rule
in the petroleum code. Those decisions holding it void, however, have done so on the
ground that it was a regulation of intrastate commerce only. Three decisions have held
the rule valid: Victor v. Ickes, 61 Wash. L. Rep. 870 (D. C. 1933); United States v.
Rose Oil Co., U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 89, col. 3 (S. D. Miss. 1934); United States
v. Konstendt, The Blue Eagle, Sept. 17, 1934, at 4, col. 1 (E. D. Mich. 1934). Two havo
held it void: United States v. Suburban Motor Service Corp., 5 F. Supp. 798 (N. D.
Ill. 1934); United States v. Mills, 7 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1934); see Cline v. Consumers'
Cooperative Gas and Oil Co., Inc., 152 Misc. 653 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1934),
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on the evasive ground of misleading advertisement.03 More frequently the cade
provisions are simply accepted as prima facie proof that the standard set is
correct, and the result of this attitude has been the issuance of injunctions
restraining code violators from selling jewelry at retail under the guise of
conducting an auction,94 using silk textile designs not properly registered s
and failing properly to inspect and adjust speedometers in the sale of new
cars; 96 the denial of an injunction restraining the issuance of clothing labels
by a code authority; 97 and the conviction of renting parking space below the
advertised price.98 Thus the judicial enforcement of this aspect of the recovery
legislation has produced a very real administrative control over many small
details of business.
LABOR PROBLEMS
Section 7(a) of the NIRA, and code provisions relating to hours and wvages,
constitute the primary contributions of the Recovery Act to labor law. The
effect of this legislation is best studied in relation first, to the resulting sub-
stantive rights or privileges thus guaranteed to labor, and secondly, to the
remedial or procedural methods afforded for the enforcement of these rights.
Substantive Rights. The right of collective organizing and bargaining, "free
from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents" is guaranteed to labor by the codes.9 9 It has been said at times that
this provision is superfluous in that it merely recognizes a right of labor already
in existence. 00 This statement is, however, misleading. The right to organize
for cooperative activity did exist formerly, but for the most part it existed only
in the limited sense that the right was not prohibited by law.101 The common
law, on the other hand, never penalized mere "interference" by an employer
with collective bargaining, and state legislation directed against employer co-
ercion was generally held unconstitutional' 02  Section 7(a), as contained in
the codes, is far from superfluous since it now makes collective organizing and
bargaining a positive right, interference with which is punished as a statutory
crime.j03 And the Section has even further strengthened the right of collective
93. People of California v. Capital Cleaners and Dyers, U. S. L. Week, Mfar. 27, 1934,
at 633, col. 1 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal. 1934) (State act); State v. Patton, The Blue
Eagle, Aug. 27, 1934, at 4, col. 2 (Ct. Crim. Corr., St. Louis, Mo. 1934).
94. Gross v. Jamaica Auction Galleries, 2 NRA Rep. 237 (App. Div., N. Y. 1934).
95. United States v. Adolph Meirowitz, Inc., U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 90, col. I
(S. D. N. Y. 1934).
96. United States v. Automobile Sales Co., U. S. L. Week, Oct. 2, 1934, at 90, col. 1
(W. D. Tenn. 1934).
97. William F. Chinquy Co. v. Budwig, The Blue Eagle, Sept. 17, 1934, at 4, col. 2
(S. D. N. Y. 1934).
98. People v. Schuyler, 2 NRA Rep. 151 (Ct. Sp. Ses., N. Y. 1934).
99. § 7(a) is incorporated in the codes. Without such incorporation the section has
no binding effect.
100. Comment (1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 553, 556.
101. Comment (1933) 19 ST. Louis L. Rzv. 32, 34.
102. Comment (1933) 47 HaRv. L. Rzv. 85, 120, 121. This Comment states that
"restraint" and "coercion" were possibly tortious at common law.




bargaining by the important implication, drawn from its provisions, that an
employer must treat with the representative so selected. 10 4 This implication
is a radical development in labor law. Two decisions have indeed attempted
to limit the effect of this implication by denying the necessity of an employer
to treat with an outside union agent as a representative of his employees. 05
But legal comment is invariably to the effect that such agents may be the
accredited representatives of the employees, 0 and on appeal one of the unfa-
vorable decisions was in effect reversed.
10 7
A supplemental right to that of collective bargaining has also been acquired
by labor through the medium of Section 7(a). This is the negative, but never-
theless, important, right of freedom from "yellow dog" contracts. No deci-
sions have as yet been handed down interpreting the Section in this connection.
The right to strike is not specifically mentioned by the NIRA. However,
certain courts appear to consider this right to be somewhat curtailed as a
result of such legislation. In the first place, it has been held that strikes for
a dosed shop are illegal,10 8 and this thought has been echoed by lawyers and
commentators alike.0 09 The apparent reason for the belief that strikes called
to effectuate the closed shop are illegal is that Section 7(a) guarantees free
collective bargaining, and that the closed shop denies the latter right. But
the National Labor Relations Board has given a practical interpretation of
Section 7(a) to the effect that the decision of a majority of employees may bind
the minority." 0 It follows therefore that if the majority of employees vote
for the closed shop, Section 7(a) requires rather than forbids the complete
unionization of a plant, a view that other courts have expressly upheld.n In
the second place, the right to strike has been held to be restricted by the NIRA,
104. Comment (1933) 47 HARv. L. REv. 85, 118, 119.
105. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 114 N. J. Eq.
307, 168 At. 799 (1933); see H. B. Rosenthal-Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, 149 Misc. 210
(Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1933).
106. Seller, Thre Effect of Section 7A of the National Industrial Recovery Act Upon the
Rights of Employer and Employees (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. 237, 241; Note (1934) 47
HARv. L. REv. 712.
107. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq.
146, 172 Atl. 551 (1934).
108. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bowles, U. S. L. Week, March 27, 1934, at 12, col. 1 (C. P.,
Cuyahoga Co., Ohio 1934); cf. J. Lichtman and Sons v. Leather Workers' Industrial
Union, 114 N. J. Eq. 596, 169 AtI. 498 (1933).
109. Williams, Employee Relations Under The National Recovery Act (1933) 26 LAw
AND BANic. 291, 292, 293; Comment (1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 553, 558; Comment (1934)
43 Y. x L. J. 625, 632, 633; N. Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1934, at 8, col. 3 (statement of chief
of government counsel in the Weirton case).
110. In re Houde Engineering Corp. and United Automobile Workers Federal Union,
U. S. L. Week, Sept. 4, 1934, at 11, col. 1 (1934). The majority rule was also upheld In
Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 462, 168 At. 862 (1933).
111. Buckingham Cafeteria, Inc. v. Meservish, The Blue Eagle, Aug. 13, 1934, at 4,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1933); Kings County Haberdashers' Association v. Retail Hat and
Furnishing Salesmen's Union, ibid; H. B. Rosenthal-Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, 149 Misc.
210 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1933).
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in two decisions at least, to the extent of completely eliminating such right.
It is said that strikes are now illegal, as interfering with the recovery program
and violating the spirit of the Recovery Act."-" This ruling completely over-
looks the fact that Section 7(a) was enacted at the insistence and for the benefit
of labor, which makes it improbable that Congress intended to outlaw strikes.
The NIRA does not deny the right to strike, and both legal periodicals"13 and
courts"14 have been quick to point out this fact.
Similarly the right to picket has apparently been unaffected by the NTIRA."'
The few decisions outlawing strikes have forbidden picketing "in large num-
bers." - °" Picketing, however, has in general been freely permitted, where un-
attended by violence," 7 and has even been dignified by its approved use on
the part of a government agency. The Regional Code Authority for the Dry
Cleaning Industry in Cleveland was permitted to picket the business establish-
ment of an alleged code violator." 8
Finally, a right to higher minimum wages and shorter maximum hours of
labor has been secured to labor by the codes. Without question these code
provisions have been frequently evaded. Thus when code wage and hours
of labor regulations were held not to apply to apprentices," 0 there at time
ensued discharges of skilled workers and reemployment of the same men as
"apprentices." However, labor has undoubtedly gained by the codes through
acquisition of a legal right to higher wages and shorter hours than were for-
merly enjoyed, and this right has in general been recognized by employers.
112. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 114 N. J. Eq.
307, 168 AtI. 799 (1933); J. Lichtman and Sons v. Leather Workers' Industrial Union,
114 N. J. Eq. 596, 169 At. 498 (1933).
113. Even when the writer sympathizes with the result reached by the above case.
Comment (1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 346.
114. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq.
146, 172 At. 551 (1934); Robbins v. Altenberg, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 9, 1933, at 1690, col. 1
(Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1933). The effect of outlawing strikes would be to make arbitration:
compulsory. This is -opposed on the grounds of policy by some writers. Comment (1934)
43 YALE L. J. 625, 635-640; Note (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 175, 177; d. Phitlip', Comn-
mercial Arbitration Under The NRA (1934) 1 U. or C m L. Rxv. 424. But cf. Comment
(1934) 19 IowA L. REv. 346, 352, 353.
115. Unless the Act changes the public policy of jurisdictions which have hitherto frowned
on picketing. For a discussion of picketing before and after the NIRA, see Comment
(1933) 33 COL. L. Rav. 1188.
116. See note 112, supra; also H. B. Rosenthal-Ettlinger Co. v. Schlossberg, 149 Mi.
210 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. 1933).
117. Charles Levy and Sons v. Needle Trades Workers' Industrial Union, The Blue
Eagle, Aug. 20, 1934, at 4, col. 2 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal. 1934); Bayonne TextL!
Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N. 3. Eq. 146, 172 At]. 551 (1934);
Fuller Cleaning and Dyeing Co. v. Morris Brickner, U. S. L. Week, May 8, 1934, at 13,
col. 1 (C. P. Cuyahoga Co., Ohio 1934); Boston Lunch, Inc. v. American Federation of
Labor Local, The Blue Eagle, Aug. 20, 1934, at 4, col. 2 (Cir. Ct., Milwaukee, Wis. 1934).
118. Bernstein v. Retail Cleaners' and Dyers' Association, U. S. L. Week, March 27,
1934, at 12, col 2 (C. P., Cuyahoga Co., Ohio 1934).
119. For a typical view, see Hyatt v. Bookman Shoe Co., The Blue Eagle, Aug. 27.
1934, at 4, col. 2 (J. P, Tulsa, Okla. 1934).
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The right has, moreover, been granted labor without restricting its freedom
of action in any manner. Employees are at perfect liberty to bargain for
greater concessions than those granted by the codes.
120
Procedural Rights. The least disputed of the benefits conferred by the
NIRA on labor was the provision for government enforcement of the sub-
stantive rights granted by that legislation. Employers, entrenched behind
the open shop and waiting lists of unemployed workers, were thereby coerced
for the first time into granting the minimum of decent wages and working con-
ditions. To date no great activity has been noted among district attorneys
to institute actual proceedings against violators of code labor provisions, due
to uncertainty over the constitutionality of the NIRA; 121 but nevertheless
such violators of code regulations have occasionally been penalized by fines,'"-
and have been enjoined from continuing such violations.
123
The right of employees to bring individual proceedings to enforce code
provisions is less conclusively established, as has been seen previously in the
discussion of the individual's right to enforce the recovery legislation. How-
ever, employees have been uniformly successful in recovering wages to which
they were entitled by the President's Reemployment Agreement, and employee
actions to recover wages set by codes have been permitted, although less fre-
quently. Likewise violations by employers of the President's Agreement, and
in one instance of code provisions, have been enjoined at the request of com-
plainant employees.12 4 If ultimately the individual's right to enforce the codes
is definitely established, the result will be that labor will be in a position,
through the medium of employee suits financed by unions, to supplement the
activities of district attorneys in securing strict code observance by employers.
Finally, an indirect remedial right is afforded to labor by the doctrine of
"unclean hands." In a much discussed case, an employer sought an injunction
to restrain alleged violence and intimidation on the part of his striking em-
ployees, but he was refused this remedy on the grounds that he was violating
the wage and hours of labor provisions of the NIRA code and thus was coming
into court with "unclean hands.' 1 25  If this defense by striking employers and
120. Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq.
146, 172 Atl. 551 (1934).
121. But cf. The Perkins case, reported by Mark Sullivan, N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Oct.
22, 1934, at 2, cols. 2, 3, wherein it is stated that the trial of an employer who refused
to pay code wages is to be prosecuted before the federal district court in Harrisburg, Pa.,
on Dec. 2, 1934, as a test case.
122. United States v. Allied Dye and Print Works, Inc., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 4,
1934, at 4, col. 1 (D. N. J. -1934); United States v. Perfect Coat and Suit Co., The
Blue Eagle, Aug. 27, 1934, at 4, col 2 (D. N. J. 1934); United States v. Radiance
Pierce Dye Works, Inc., The Blue Eagle, Sept. 4, 1934, at 4, col. 1 (D. N. J. 1934);
United States v. Clyde Mills, Inc., The Blue Eagle, Aug. 27, 1934, at 4, col. 2 (D.
R. I. 1934); cf. United States v. Hercules Gas Station Inc., The Blue Eagle, Aug. 27,
1934, at 4, col. 1 (E. D. N. Y. 1933).
123. United States v. Tung, The Blue Eagle, Sept. 10, 1934, at 4, col. 2 (E. D.
La. 1934).
124. For a discussion of this subject and cited cases, see pp.
125. La Mode Garment Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, The
Blue Eagle, Aug. 13, 1934, at 4, col. 1 (Cir. Ct., Cook Co., I1. 1933).
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union organizers is generally recognized, observance by employers of the sub-
stantive rights of labor guaranteed by the codes will be greatly stimulated.
Extra-judicial comment strongly favors the application of "unclean hands" or
a similar principle to an employer proven to be a code violator; 12 0 and it
would appear that this flexible doctrine may be safely applied to defeat an indi-
vidual employer's request for injunctive relief, without at the same time bind-
ing a court to deny relief to every code violator regardless of circumstances.
The concrete rights granted to labor by the NIRA are valuable. It may
prove, however, that the most valuable result of this legislation is not to be
found in tangible legal privileges. A careful reading of the labor cases arising
to date under the NIRA discloses that for the first time opponents of collective
activity and supplemental labor rights appear to be on the defensive, and that
even where labor privileges are denied, the courts seem less positive of the
legality of this denial. The NIRA may well be acclaimed by labor if it suc-
ceeds, where other legislation has failed, in influencing judicial thought to a
more favorable view of collective activity by labor.
VOIDABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY OF TRANSFERS RECORDED
WITHIN THE FOUR MONTHS PERIOD
IF one about to become a bankrupt satisfies or secures the claim of one creditor
by a "transfer"' 1 shortly prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the
pro tanto depletion2 of the estate at a time when all cannot be paid in full is
unfair to other creditors of the same class. Accordingly, in Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act trustees in bankruptcy are empowered under certain conditions
to abrogate the effect of such a preferential transfer. Section 60a defines a
preference as a transfer made to a creditor within four months of the petition
in bankruptcy by an insolvent debtor, whereby that creditor obtains a greater
percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same class. Section 60b
126. Seller, The Effect of Section 7A of the National Industrial Recovery Act Upon 1I.-
Rights of Employer and Employee (1933) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. 237, 249, 250; Note (1933)
33 COL. L. REv. 1264; Comment (1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 553, 563-564.
1. As used in the Bankruptcy Act, "transfer" includes "the sale and every other and
different mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the posesson of property,
absolutely or conditionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift, or security?' 30 ST,%r. 545
(1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (25) (1926).
2. "There can be no preferential transfer without a depletion of the bankrupt's
estate." GILBERT, COL=im ox BAuxrauprcy (3d ed. 1934) § 1169. National Bank of Newport
v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U. S. 178, 184 (1912).
3. "A person shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent, he has,
within four months before the filing of the petition, or after the filing of the petition and
before the adjudication, procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself in
favor of any person, or made a transfer to [of] any of his property, and the effect of the
enforcement of such judgment or transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the salme cdas.
Where the preference consists in a transfer, such period of four months shall not expire
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states that a transfer shall be voidable by the trustee if certain specified ele-
ments are found to exist, viz., that at the time of the transfer, and being within
the four months preceding the petition in bankruptcy, the transferor be in-
solvent, that the transfer then operate as a preference, and that the transferee
have reasonable cause so to believe.4 By these provisions the vulnerable char-
acter of an outright preferential transfer made within the four months period
is clearly established. And although the execution of the transfer may ante-
date the petition by more than four months, if by the local law creditors are
not bound by such a transfer unless recorded, failure to secure recordation of
the instrument prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy will expose it
to attack by the trustee in his representative character.5 When, however, the
until four months after the date of the recording or registering of the transfer, if by law
such recording or registering is required or permitted." 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended
32 STAT. 799 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96a (1926). "Or permitted" was added by 44 STAT.
666 (1926).
4. "If a bankrupt shall have procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against
him in favor of any person or have made a transfer of any of his property, and If, at the
time of the transfer, or of the entry of the judgment, or of the recording or registering
of the transfer if by law recording or registering thereof is required, and being within four
months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or after the filing thereof and before
the adjudication, the bankrupt be insolvent and the judgment or transfer then operate as
a preference, and the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting
therein, shall then have reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of such judgment
or transfer would effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee and he may recover
the property or its value from such person. And for the purpose of such recovery any
court of bankruptcy, as hereinbefore defined, and any state court which would have had
jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall have concurrent jurisdiction." 30 STAT.
562 (1898), as amended 32 STAT. 800 (1903), 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96b
(1926).
5. Thus by Sections 67a, 67b and 70e the trustee represents all actual creditors and by
virtue of Section 47a(2) is a lien creditor after the fling of the petition, whether
there are such creditors or not. Barbee v. Spurrier Lumber Co., 64 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A.
10th, 1933). When the state recording act protects lien creditors or any class of creditors
actually represented, the trustee can, therefore, invoke the local law to avoid the unrecorded
transfer. § 47a(2): ". . . and such trustees, as to all property in the custody or coming
into the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights,
remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon;
and also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed
vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor holding an execu-
tion duly returned unsatisfied; . . ." 30 STAT. 557 (1898), as amended 36 STAT. 840
(1910), 11 U. S. C. A. § 75a(2) (1926).
§ 67a: "Claims which for want of record or for other reasons would not have been
valid hens [i.e. under state law] as against the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt
shall not be Hens against his estate." 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 107a (1926).
§ 67b: "Whenever a creditor is prevented from enforcing his rights as against a lien
created, or attempted to be created, by his debtor, who afterwards becomes a bankrupt, the
trustee of the estate of such bankrupt shall be subrogated to and may enforce such rights
of such creditor for the benefit of the estate." 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 107b
(1926).
§ 70e: "The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of his property which any
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execution of the transfer antedates the petition by more than four months,
but the instrument is properly recorded within the four months period, the
avoidance of the transfer presents a controversial problem.0 State recording
acts are supposedly designed to protect persons dealing with a present or pros-
pective debtor by making available full information as to the true state of his
resources.7 But the efficacy of recording requirements is sometimes seriously
limited, since a given state may demand that only certain types of transfers
be recorded and may permit only certain limited classes of parties to attack:
an unrecorded instrument.8 Knowledge of prior transfers or of liens already
given on a debtor's property may thus often be withheld from creditors who,
relying on the false security of his apparent ownership,0 take no immediate
steps to enforce satisfaction of their claims. When failure seems to be inevi-
table, the transfer or lien may be put on record, thereby becoming valid as
against creditors not so secured, unless bankruptcy should intervene to alter
the result. The patent unfairness to creditors who have been misled by the
concealment and delay renders the recordation, within four months of bank-
ruptcy, of a previously executed transfer just as objectionable as a transfer
which is itself executed during the critical period. But while such tardy val-
idation of "secret liens" earns broad condemnation, 10 both legislative and judi-
creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, and may recover the property so transferred,
or its value, from the person to whom it was transferred, unless ber was a bona fide holder
for value prior to the date of the adjudication. . ." 30 STAT. 566 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 110e (1926).
6. Technically, this situation is to be distinguished from the "equitable liens" involved
in Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U. S. 90 (1912); In re Traut's Estate, 297 Fed. 453
(C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Burrowes v. Nimocks, 35 F. (2d) 152 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929). But
in reality the problem is very similar.
7. "The object of recording acts is to prevent the obtaining of credit by reason of the
ostensible ownership of property which in reality is covered by a secret lien by giving
notice to those intending to purchase such property and to creditors who give credit on
the faith thereof." GmBERr, op. cit, supra note 2 § 1343.
The state recording acts involved in the most commonly recurrent transactions are
treated in detail in 1 JoEs, CHATrEL MORTGAGES A AD Co:NrroYr; SArs (6th ed. 1933)
c. 6 (chattel mortgages); 3 id. c. 22, 23 I. (conditional sales). See also Hanna, Thec
Extension of Public Recordation (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 617, 638. For statutes on real
property transactions, see 1 JoNES, Mlo RTGAGEs or REAL ProPm'Z (Sth ed. 1928) § 570.
Distinguish the problem of special statutory liens such as that involved in Eggleston v.
Birmingham Purchasing Co., 15 F. (2d) 529 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926).
S. For demonstration of the incomprehensiveness of the state recording statutes and
the lack of uniformity among comparable acts of the different states see 1 oNmms, CrA-mr.
MORTGAGES AND CODMoNAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) §§ 190, 242c, 247b; 3 id. §§ 1033, 1111,
1112, 1135; 1 JONES, MIORTGAGES or REAL PROPERTY (8th ed. 1928) §§ 570, 576, 579;
WALsn, THE LAW OP Pxopmrv (2d, ed. 1927) §§ 338, 339, 348.
9. The scope of this discussion is limited to those cases of ostensible ownership in which
the state law would permit recordation of the transactions. Nor is it intended to treat
the problem of actual, fraudulent agreements to withhold from record. Consult Crothers v.
Soper, 10 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Rankin v. Cox, 71 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A.
8th, 1934); cf. In re Selfridge, 33 F. (2d) 800 (D. Mlass. 1929).
10. See, e.g., SEY. RP. No. 691, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) 8, quoted in In re T. H.
Bunch Commission Co., 225 Fed. 243, 249 (E. D. Ark. 1915).
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cial ingenuity have alike failed effectively to prevent the unequal
distribution of assets which results from such a practice.
The original statute of 1898"i did not anticipate this exigency. By the-
amendment of 1903,3 however, it was provided in Section 60a, defining a
preference, that the four months, during which the transfer in question must
have been made in order to be a preference, should begin to run only after
recordation, if recordation of the transfer were "required." But the trustee
in bankruptcy at that time had no better standing to attack the transfer than
had the bankrupt himself12 or the creditors actually represented by the trustee
under Sections 67a, 67b and 70e,5 all of whom could be cut off by recordation
before the petition. And since all transfers preferential under the terms of
Section 60a were not necessarily voidable by authority of Section 60b,1 3 there
was often thus afforded no more effective way than previously existed 14 to
question the immunity of a preferential transfer withheld from record until
within the four months period. Further steps were taken in the revision of
the Bankruptcy Act in 1910, when Section 47a(2)5 was amended to give the
trustee the position of a lien creditor as to property in the custody of the
bankruptcy court, and, as to property not in custody, the position of a judg-
ment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied. Moreover, although Section
60a was not altered, Section 60b was put in its present form, providing that
the trustee may avoid the challenged transfer if, at the time of the transfer,
or of its recording if by law such recording is "required," and being within the
four months preceding the petition, the requisite elements are found to exist.
4
The crucial question at this time was the meaning of the word "required"
as used in Section 60b. In the absence of a determinative ruling by the Su-
preme Court, a divergence of view soon appeared in the Circuit Courts of
Appeals. On one hand it was held that by the word "required" reference
was made to the "character of the instrument." Thus, if the local statute
required recordation in order to validate the transfer as against any protected
class, it was "required" to be recorded, within the terms of Section 60b, and
failure so to record until within the four months period preceding the filing
of the petition rendered the transaction vulnerable as a voidable preference. 15,
11. 30 STAT. 544 (1898).
12. York Manufacturing Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 352 (1906).
13. See Piie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 446 (1901); Irving Trust
Co. v. Chase National Bank, 65 F. (2d) 409, 410 (C. C. A. 2d., 1933). This distinction
was explicitly recognized by Congress in 1903 in amending Section 57g to read: "Tho'
claims of creditors who have received preferences, voidable under section sixty, subdivision
b . . ." (italics ours). 32 STAT. 799 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93g (1926). See GinERi,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 1147.
14. The powers of the trustee under state laws, derived from Sections 67a, 61b and
70e, supra note 5, are pertinent chiefly by way of contrast. The amendments of Section 60
here discussed seek to reach a different and more difficult problem, one not solely of rlghts.
under state law [see Holt v. Crucible Steel Co., 224 U. S. 262, 265 (1912); cf. Bunch v.
Maloney, 233 Fed. 967, 970 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916)] but of affirmative rights under the
Bankruptcy Act as well.
15. English v. Ross, 140 Fed. 630 (M. D. Pa. 1905); First National Bank v. Connett,
142 Fed. 33 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); Loeser v. Savings Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 148 Fed.
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The other view maintained that the class of parties protected under the per-
tinent recording act controlled. Thus, unless the attacking trustee by virtue
of the position given him by the Bankruptcy Act represented persons of the
class protected by the local statute, the transfer was not voidable by him under
Section 60b, since its recordation, although within the critical four months
period, was not "required" as to him.'0
The latter interpretation ultimately received the sanction of the Supreme
Court in Carey v. Donokue17 in 1916. A deed of land there involved was, by
the terms of the state recording statute, fraudulent until recorded, as against
a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Creditors, how-
ever, could not attack the transfer; since the trustee under Section 47a(2)
could represent only creditors, he was not deemed to be a bona fide purchaser,
and, as to him, recordation was in such circumstances immaterial. The Court
stated that ". . the intended meaning was to embrace those cases in which
recording was necessary in order to make the transfer valid as against those
concerned in the distribution of the insolvent estate; that is, as against cred-
itors, including those whose position the trustee was entitled to take."18 Two
years later the Court further clarified its restrictive construction of Section 60b
in Martin v. Commercial National Bank.'0 A chattel mortgage in that case
was, by the local law, valid between the parties without recordation, but not
as to intervening lienors or purchasers before recordation. After reviewing
the earlier cases of Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co.
20 and Carey v. Donohu07e T
and reaffirming the interpretation of "required" therein made, the Court said
that ". . before a trustee may avoid a transfer because of the provision
in question he must in fact represent or be entitled to take the place of some
creditor whose claim actually stood in a superior position to the challenged
transfer while unrecorded and within the specified period."2' 1  Since there was
in fact no such creditor, and since the trustee's position under Section 47a(2)
could become his only at the date of the petition, he was powerless to avoid
975 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906); In re Beckhaus, 177 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910); Mattley v.
Giesler, 187 Fed. 970 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); Ragan v. Donovan, 189 Fed. 138 (N. D. Ohio
1911); In re T. H. Bunch Commission Co., 225 Fed. 243 (E. D. Ark. 1915) afrd 233 Fed.
967 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) [even after Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430 (1916)] rev'd
per curiam 246 U. S. 658 (1918) [on authority of Martin v. Commercial National Bank,
245 U. S. 513 (1918)1; cf. In re Dundore, 26 Am. B. R. 100 (AT. D. Pa. 1911).
16. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Pipkin Drug Co., 136 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 5th, 1905); In
re Hunt, 139 Fed. 283 (N. D. N. Y. 1905); In re McIntosh, 150 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 9th,
1907); In re Boyd, 213 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); In re Roberts, 227 Fed. 177 (N. D.
Ga. 1915).
17. 240 U. S. 430 (1916). The decision was favorably discussed in Note (1916) 29
HARv. L. REy. 766; the opposite holding of the lower court in the case had ban strongly
approved in Note (1914) 14 COL. L. R v. 440.
18. Id. at 437.
19. 245 U. S. 513 (1918). The decision was adversely criticized in Note (1913) 16
McH. L. REv. 258.
20. 239 U. S. 268 (1915) (involving a conditional sale).
21. 245 U. S. 513 (1918) at 519.
22. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (1915) at 276.
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a preference which had been validated by recordation only one day before the-
filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
The inevitable effect of these decisions, sharply curtailing the operation of
section 60b, was to secure virtual immunity for many types of secret liens.
The Supreme Court, however, placed responsibility for its decisions upon the
language of the Bankruptcy Act.23  An intent to render Section 60b more
utile might therefore be imputed to the subsequent Congressional amendment
in 1926 of Section 60a, which added "or permitted" to the word "required." a
Thus if Sections 60a and 60b were to be read together, the trustee might now
be able to avoid a preferential transfer recorded within four months, where
recordation of the instrument is by the local law "required or permitted."
2 4
The intention that they should be so read together might have been suggested
by the discussion in Carey v. Donohue of a similar amendment of Section 60a
which had been proposed, but rejected in 1903 ;25 the abandoned amendment
was there regarded as one which would have had an important bearing on the
powers of the trustee under Section 60b.26 What little light is thrown by the
reports of committee hearings on the purpose of Congress in enacting the
amendment of 1926 seems to lend support to this contention. 2  And it is
23. Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430 (1916) at 436; Martin v. Commercial National
Bank, 245 U. S. 513 (1918) at 518. It has been suggested by way of speculation that the
Supreme Court's willingness to construe the Act strictly is perhaps due to the fact that
many of its members have been equity lawyers and therefore were formerly accustomed
to tracing specific liens. McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act (1927) 40 I-Ltv.
L. REv. 341, 390.
24. This view is strongly advanced in the recent case of Foltz v. Davis, 68 F. (2d) 49S
(C. C. A. 7th, 1934) and in Matter of Bowles, 14 Am. B. R. (x. s.) 133 (Ref. Neb. 1928)
(dictum).
25. 35 CoNG. REC. 6938, 6943 (1902); see Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430 (1916)
at 436.
26. "This distinction between the test of the right to institute bankruptcy proccedings
and the test of the right to recover from one who had received a transfer alleged to be a
preference lay in the terms of the act and could not rightly be ignored. It was urged
that the result was to encourage secret preferential transfers; but the wisdom of the pre-
scribed condition of recovery . . . was a matter for legislative, not judicial, consideration.
To secure this conformity, an amendment . . . added to § 60a the following clause:
[a provision much like that now in force, concerning required or permitted recordation]
. . . The Senate struck from this proposed amendment all that follows the words 'if by
law such recording or registering is required,' . . . There is no basis for the assumption
that the words . . . were ultimately deemed to be surplusage, for these words had an
obviously distinct significance . . ." Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430 (1916) at 436,
See also In re Beckbaus, 177 Fed. 141 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910) at 143.
27. In most of the hearings the amendment was merely stated, and comment, If any,
was entirely cursory. But on one occasion it was stated by a representative of the National
Credit Men's Association that "the effect of the proposed amendment would be to make.
such conveyance invalid as against the trustee in bankruptcy in any case where the law
permits it to be filed or recorded, thereby compelling, in some cases the filing or recording
of the conveyance and in all cases giving creditors notice of the fact that the transfer or
conveyance has taken place." Hearing before House Committee on Judiciary on Revision
of the Bankruptcy Law, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925) 20.
[Vol. 44
4]COMMENTS
the opinion of some writers that the expansion of Section 60a should be given
-the wide operation suggested.28
An argument may indeed be made that under the Act as it now stands the
two sections can be read together and the desired result obtained without
,doing too great violence to the legislative language. One of the prerequisites
to the avoidance of a transfer under Section 60b is that it shall operate as a
"preference," a characteristic defined by Section 60a. An integral part of this
section is the provision that the four months within which a transfer must
have been made in order to be considered preferential shall not run until after
the transfer has been recorded, if recordation is "required or permitted." The
preferential character of the recordation of a transfer within four months of a
petition is thus unequivocally defined by Section 60a. If the separate existence
-of this section is to be of any significance, the conflict of its terms concerning
recordation with the corresponding words of Section 60b must be resolved
against the latter; for otherwise the amendment of Section 60a in 1926 must
be held merely to have made a futile addition to what was already confusing
redundance. Moreover, under this interpretation, meaning is given to the
Tather obvious statement that the amendment makes the terms of Section 60a
conform more closely with Section 3b, which measures the time for filing a
petition in bankruptcy.P Therefore, so far as recordation is involved, Section
60a should control in determining under Section 60b what transfers are not
.only preferential, but also voidable.2 4 And some support is given this argu-
ment by language referring generally to these two sections without accurate
differentiation,30 and by occasional references to Section 60a as the section which
deals with the trustee's power to avoid preferences. 31
28. "In the author's opinion, it was the intent of Congress to apply the same meas e
to the definition and the trustee's right of avoidance and the two subsections should L3
read together." GILBERT, CoLrm ON BAxuR'rcv (2d ed. 1931) 378. See also CoL=,
Bmamuprv (13th ed. 1923) (Supp. 1934) 427 [1260]; Luberger, Improvements in the
Bankruptcy Act and in its Administration (1925) 10 IowA L. BuT. 209, 215, 217; Colin,
An Analysis of the 1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act (1926) 26 COL. L. l"E,. 789,
ol; cf. 4 REXI,'IGToy, BAnxxPc=Y (3d ed. 1923) (Supp. 1934) § 1790.
29. § 3b: ". . . Such time [for filing a petition] shall not expire until four months
after (1) the date of the recording or registering of the transfer . . . if by law Euch
recording or registering is required or permitted . . ." 30 STAT. 546 (1893), 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 21b (1926). Cf. In re Ageloff Realty Co, 5 F. Supp. 295 (E. D. N. Y. 1933). See also
Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430 (1916) at 435, and note 26, supra.
"The grounds upon which the senate decided, if as a matter of fact it did so deliberately,
that section 60 should not conform to section 3-b are not known and no reasonable justi-
fication for such a conclusion is apparent. Any preference, constituting an act of bank-
ruptcy under section 3 ought to be avoidable by the trustee under section 60. Conv.rely
a preference that cannot be avoided under section 60 ought not to be the basis of an
involuntary petition." Luberger, supra note 28, at 217.
30. See Stephens v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 36 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930);
In re Carr, 39. F. (2d) 916, 917 (M. D. Pa. 1930); Ehrlich v. Johnson Service Co., 272
Mass. 385, 389, 172 N. E. 503, 510 (1930).
31. See e.g., Corney v. Saltzman, 22 F. (2d) 268, 269 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ("Section 60a
. . makes voidable . . ."); Credito y Ahorro Ponceno v. Gorbia, 25 F. (2d) 817, 819 (C. C.
A. Ist, 1928); Baker v. Chisholm, 268 Mlass. 1, 5, 167 N. E. 321, 322 (1929).
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But this argument is not entirely convincing. By its terms, the amendment
of 1926 refers only to the running of the four months period in identifying
the transfer as a preference. Accordingly, the provision regarding "required"
recordation in Section 60b, the section which alone states which preferential
transfers are voidable by the trustee,' 3 is not affected by broadening the scope
of Section 60a. However wide the category of "preferential transfer" may be
made, operation as a preference remains but one of the elements which Section
60b requires to make the transfer voidable; so far as the pertinence of record-
ation to voidability is concerned, Section 60b is self-sustaining. And since
"or permitted" was not added to "required" in Section 60b, but only in Section
60a, it seems over-sanguine to claim' that the enactment of 1926 has settled
the matter.3 2  If in fact the greater power to avoid now exists in favor of the
trustee, certainly it does not appear to have been successfully exercised; the
reported cases, with some exceptions,3 3 stay well within the limits of the rule
of Carey v. Donohue and Martin v. Commercial National Bank.84  Nor does
it seem likely that if this somewhat strained interpretation of the 1926 amend-
ment should be urged upon the Supreme Court, it would abandon the attitude
of restrictive construction which it manifested in those earlier cases.
Revision of the Bankruptcy Act is necessary, not merely to strengthen the
hand of the trustee in levelling preferences, but also to clarify and systematize
the exercise of that function. Short of reforming all the state laws or setting
up a comprehensive and independent set of recording standards for bankruptcy
purposes, the obvious expedient, and the one which has in fact been incorpor-
ated into the Bankruptcy Act, is to make use of such terms as the applicable
state statutes may happen to contain. But the "glaring lack of uniformity" in
the recording statutes, when projected into bankruptcy proceedings, must lead
to radically differing results in situations which may otherwise be identical in
factual composition. And such inconsistency runs counter to the ideal of
32. The claim has been made in general terms. See, e.g., note 28 supra. Many com-
mentators, however, have carefully restricted the amendment to its language, some deploring
its failure effectively to attack secret liens. See Report of the Special Committee on Prac-
tice in Bankruptcy Matters (1925) 50 A. B. A. REP. 478, 489; Robinson, The Scope and
Effect of the 1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act (1926) 12 CoN. L. Q. 49, $55
McLaughlin, supra note 23, at 374 et seq.; Douglas, Book Review (1927) 27 COL. L. REV.
765, 766; Scott, Recordation Provisions in the Bankruptcy Act (1932) 18 VA. L. REV. 249,
262; cf. 4 REMINGTON, Ic. cit. supra note 28. See also GiLBMRT, op. cit. sulpra note 2, §N'
1147, 1156, and contrast the statement from the earlier edition quoted note 28, supra.
33. Foltz v. Davis, 68 F. (2d) 495 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Stokes v. Johnson, 352 Ill, 371,
185 N. E. 567 (1933); see Matter of Bowles, 14 AM. B. R. (N. s.) 133, 140 (Ref. Neb.
1928); cf. John Hetherington & Sons v. Rudisill, 28 F. (2d) 713, 716 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928);
In re Wisconsin Refining Corp., 63 F. (2d) 159 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
34. Hirschfeld v. Nogle, 5 F. Supp. 234 (E. D. Ill. 1933) and cases therein cited at 237;
Stover v. Valley National Bank, 48 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931) cert. den. 284 U. S.
631 (1931); Marks v. Wenzel, '6 F. Supp. 981 (E. D. N. Y. 1932); In re Finley, 6 F. Supp
105 (M. D. N. C. 1933); Small-Ferrer, Inc. v. Ware, 68 F. (2d) 366 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934);
Bank of Wadesboro v. Little, 71 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); In re Lloyd, 6 F.




uniformity in bankruptcy administration, which is sought for reasons not only
-of convenience and practicability, but also of equitable result. The primary
-search must therefore be for some means of adapting a heterogenous pattern
to serve consistently a known and uniform purpose. Even if the words "or
permitted" which were inserted in Section 60a, had also been added to "re-
quired" in Section 60b, the result might not yet be satisfactory. As one
authority has indicated,35 almost all instruments of transfer are permitted to
be recorded in some manner, and to demand the filing of all transactions would
impose an excessive burden on commercial relations. Recordation, it is said,
ought therefore to be given operation in this connection only where, if permit-
ted, its existence would affect the rights of those interested in the bankrupt
•estate, the creditors. But it seems probable that the mere insertion of the sug-
gested words in Section 60b without making the amendment more explicit
would again require unduly extended judicial construction and would provoke
-confusion and conflict similar to that which resulted from the somewhat ambig-
uous wording adopted in 1910.36
Any revision of the existing provisions bearing on this problem ought un-
zambiguously to express the intention which motivates its adoption. It should
be so clearly the objective of the section to nullify the effect of any action or
inaction which materially and unfairly jeopardizes the interests of creditors as
to leave no room for judicial doubt.37 In view of this purpose it does not
-seem to be sufficient to limit treatment of the trustee's powers of avoidance to
those cases in which the local law may actually give recordation an insulating
-effect as against creditors. The attack should rather be directed against mala
-fide concealment of the fact that property which ostensibly belongs to the
debtor and which thus gives illusory value to his assets is already appropriated
in greater or less degree to satisfy the claim of one creditor. In some cases,
-although recordation may be permitted, the fact of recording does not, in legal
result, detract from the rights of creditors, since the transfer was valid as
-gainst them even without recordation. Yet in a situation such as that report-
ed in Carey v. Donohue, the limitation of the statutory protection to bona fide
purchasers does not preclude the probability that in fact not only purchasers,
but creditors as well are misled by the debtor's apparent ownership of the land.
It would therefore seem advisable38 to provide that the recording of any trans-
35. 4 RE=GroN, loc. cit. supra note 28.
36. See cases cited in notes 15 and 16, Supra.
37. Cf. Corney v. Saltzman, 22 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) at 270: "Congrera
intended that the creditors of a bankrupt, whether or not they have iens, are entitled to
know the bankrupt's financial standing, and a creditor who falls to record his mortgage,
or to have one executed at the time of the p3ssing of the consideration, shall not have a
fictitious credit. The statute forbids such lienor to come in afterwards and claim for
himself the property of which he has allowed the bankrupt to appear to be the abzolute
,owner."
38. An argument might even be advanced in favor of going to the length of providing
that if recordation of the transfer is permitted, but the privilege is not exercised, and if
it be demonstrated that qualified creditors were materially deceived thereby, the transfer
shall be voidable at the suit of the trustee. But the very extensive character of such a
proposal and its lack of definite criteria probably render it impracticable.
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fer, within four months of the petition, which affects adversely the interests of
relying creditors, shall itself be considered to be a "transfer."39 The whole
transaction shall then be voidable by the trustee if a concurrence of the ele-
ments stipulated in Section 60b4 is found to have existed at the time of such
"transfer." Such a provision would not only broaden the category of voidable
preferences, but would also mitigate the difficulty of establishing the conditions
of avoidability of a transfer under Section 60b, since the essential concurrence
of elements is more likely to be found during the four months period imme-
diately preceding bankruptcy than at the earlier time of the execution of the
instrument. As a supplement to this reform, and as a somewhat weaker sub-
stitute therefor in the event of its failure to be adopted, the advantageous
position of the trustee, now his at the time of the petition under Section
47a(2) ,40 should be declared to have been his retroactively during the whole
preceding four months.4' This would enable the trustee to avoid the transfers
recorded within four months in the most numerous and troublesome class of
cases, viz., where only lien creditors are protected by the recording statute and
where there are in fact no lien creditors for him to represent.42
Such changes would do much to promote a more equitable bankruptcy dis-
tribution. Conceded difficulties of proof of some of the factors herein brought
into prominence, such as the misleading of innocent creditors and the adverse
effect of secrecy upon their interests, will be outweighed by the benefits of a
requirement of more forthright conduct in commercial relations than recording
statutes now exact. In a legal system which recognizes the premise that par-
ties to credit transactions ought to act in good faith, small justification appears
for permitting secret liens to go unimpeached. Such publicity as is required
39. It may be said that there are in effect two "transfers" in the usual transaction:
one effective between the parties, at the time of execution; the other effective as to the
rest of the world when the facts become known, as by recordation. This second "transfer'
can readily be brought under the broad Bankruptcy Act definition of "transfer" in Section
1 (25), supra note 1, and therefore can be held voidable as a transfer within the four monthg.
period. See the Senate Report cited note 10, supra. Cf. In re Caslon Press, 229 Fed.
133 (C. C. A. 7th, 191); In re Havens, 255 Fed. 478, 481 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); John
Hetherington & Sons v. Rudisill, 28 F. (2d) 713, 716 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928); NogI V. Green-
wood, 1 F. Supp. 60 (M. D. Pa. 1932); Note (1905) 18 HARe. L. REV. 606, 607.
40. National Bank of Bakersfield v. Moore, 247 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) cert.
den. 247 U. S. 507 (1918); In re Duker Ave. Meat Market, 2 F. (2d) 699, 700 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1924); Albert Pick & Co. v. Wilson, 19 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Barbee
v. Spurrier Lumber Co., 64 F. (2d) 5 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933). But cf. Note (1934) 18 MMNN.
L. REv. 541.
41. Cf. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (1915) at 276. Congress can
give the trustee his position, under Section 47a(2) at the date of the petition, even If there
are actually no lien or judgment creditors from whom such rights and powers might be
derived. See cases cited in note 40, supra. And the retroactive operation of Section 60b
in avoiding outright transfers made within the four months' period is not questioned. Sim-
ilarly, the combination of these two rules, wherein the trustees' position under Section 47a
(2) is not only non-derivative, but retroactive as well, is likewise unquestionable,
42. It would not, however, allow the use of a recording act protecting only purchasers,
since this class is not included among the interested parties in bankruptcy.
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by the amendments here advocated would not result in detrimental curtailment
of credit or the premature and unnecessary precipitation into bankruptcy of
temporarily embarrassed debtors. If, when all the facts are openly shown, it
appears that the debtor's difficulties are really temporary and can probably be
overcome, creditors are not likely to preclude their chances of receiving full
payment within a reasonable time by forcing immediate bankruptcy for the
sake of a present, but fractional satisfaction of their claims. If, on the other
hand, the affairs of the debtor are so hopelessly involved as to give no promise
of eventual recovery, knowledge of this situation will discourage the futile
extension of more credit. And if a decadent course of business could thus be
checked before the remaining assets are completely wiped out, it should be
possible to minimize the severity of the economic dislocation and individual
losses evidenced by the meagre dividends of the average bankruptcy.
LIMITATION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
OVER PUBLIC UTILITY RATE CASES
A QUARTER of a century of agitation to eliminate federal court interference
with state control of public utility rates culminated in the last Congress with the
enactment of the Johnson Bill.' This bill provides that no federal district court
shall have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of state or local administrative
orders concerned with public utility rates where jurisdiction would formerly have
been invoked upon the grounds of diversity of citizenship or constitutional ques-
tion, provided that such orders do not interfere with interstate commerce, are
made after reasonable notice and hearing, and the state courts afford a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy. Previous to the passage of this bill it was possi-
ble for a public utility to force a state regulatory body to submit the constitu-
tionality of its orders to trial in a lower federal court, a procedure which was
objectionable to the states not only because it involved a federal court's passing
upon the validity of the states' regulatory action to the exclusion of a determina-
tion by the states' own courts, but also because of the expense and delay fre-
quently incident to this type of federal judicial review.
The gradual evolution of that portion of federal jurisdiction now eliminated
offers an interesting example of legal maladjustment. The strong national
sentiment engendered by the Civil War, coupled with the ascendancy of north-
ern capital and its desire to protect itself from such popular manifestations as
the Granger movement,2 led to the incorporation of a provision in the Judiciary
Act of 1875 conferring original jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts over
suits based upon claims of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.? Although
1. P. L. No. 222, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), signed by the President, May 14, 1934.
The bill amends Section 24 of the Judicial Code.
2. See F xn=Tm AN LANDIS, BusunESS or TZ Suprw- CoURT (1927) 65; 2 Win-
pmr, TaE SuppMrE COURT nT Urrrm STATES HISrORY (1928) 574 et seq.
3. 18 STAT. 470 (1875). The same jurisdiction existed during the pariod the Second
Judiciary Act was vivant: Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 STAT. 89 (1801); repealed Mar. 8,
1802, 2 STAT. 132 (1802).
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one of the purposes of this broader jurisdiction was to give federal protection
to absentee capital, public utilities were unable to take advantage of it in rate
-questions, for it was decided in 1877 by the United States Supreme Court that
rates set by a legislature could not be subject to judicial review.4 But subse-
quent conduct in state regulation gave reason for a reconsideration of this atti-
tude toward the validity of rates. Minnesota provided for the control of rail-
road rates under a distinctly arbitrary procedure which made the rate order of a
commission conclusive upon the courts. Whether the action taken by the
Minnesota commission under this provision was in fact unreasonable or whether
it was not, such control was open to possibilities of flagrant abuse. So, in 1890,
the Supreme Court reversed its previous stand and declared that although the
creation of rates was a legislative function, the reasonableness of such rates
-was a matter for judicial review to protect utilities from a deprivation of
property with'out due process of law.5 Thus the reasonableness of rates became
a constitutional question under the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, as an in-
direct result of the coexistence of, first, the enlarged federal jurisdiction and,
second, the determination that rates were to be taken under the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it was possible to test the constitutionality of rate
regulations by seeking in the federal courts an injunction against acts of en-
forcement attempted by state officers acting under the authority of allegedly
unconstitutional state statutes. However, such remedy was available in only
-special and rare instances. Section 265 of the Judicial Code0 forbade federal
courts to issue injunctions to stay proceedings in the state courts. Thus, where
a state officer could enforce a utility rate by merely resorting to judicial proceed-
ings, it was generally believed that a federal court might not interfere. 7 Only
in those few cases where compliance with a rate order was sought to be en-
forced by some positive, extra-judicial act could the state officer be enjoined.
But even here it was not certain that an injunction should issue because of the
prohibition in the Eleventh Amendment of suits against a §tate.8 Nevertheless,
on the theory that an act of a state officer sanctioned only by an unconstitutional
statute was a personal rather than an official act, such a suit was sometimes
allowed. 9
Finally, in 1908, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young declared that a suit
against a state officer attempting to enforce a state statute was definitely not
a suit against a state' 9 and the fact that enforcement was to be carried out only
4. Peik v. Chicago, 94 U. S. 164 (1877); see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 133 (1877).
5. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Rr. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890).
6. 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 379 (1926).
7. Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1169; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAMW.
L. Rav. 345.
8. In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 (1899) ; see
dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 192 (1908).
9. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894); Smyth v. Ames, 169
U. S. 466 (1898).
10. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); cf. Taylor and Willis, supra note 7, at 1191;
Warren, supra note 7, at 375.
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through judicial proceedings did not bring the attempt to enjoin the officer's
actions within the application of Section 265 as long as proceedings had not
already been instituted in the state courts." Consequently, although the Court
forbade the use of the federal injunction until the "legislative process" of fixing
rates had been completed,' 2 it was now possible for a utility to contest any
rate regulation in the federal courts.
During this period of the growth of lower federal court jurisdiction to include
rate cases, state regulation had been chiefly concerned with railroads and a few
other forms of business affected with a public interest, the regulation of the
local utilities being entrusted to the municipalities. But local utilities had in-
creased in size and power to a point where they occupied a dominant position in
local politics, and their corruption and bribery of local officials had seriously
impaired municipal regulation.' 3 Accordingly, a movement had been initiated
to transfer the control of such utilities to the state to be administered through
a central body of experts familiar with their problems. As this movement grew
so that more and more local utilities were subjected to the more effective state
regulation,14 the use of the federal injunction as a newly perfected weapon for
resisting commission control became also more widespread.
To a great extent, the problem of bringing the local utilities under central
administrative control occupied the attention of the states at that time, and
regulation of this type was still too new for the question of whether state or
federal courts should have the judicial review of that regulation to be singled
out for specific consideration. The decision in Ex parte Young had aroused a
storm of protest,15 but the main objection of the states was aimed at one prac-
11. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123; 161-163 (1908).
12. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 (1908). However, even this restriction
is limited, for where the rates pending final legislative action are not or may not be stayed, a
federal injunction may issue. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U. S.
196 (1924).
13. See Mosm AND CRAwroRD, PUBmrc Un= RmuxAmov_ (1933) c. 2; Monro ,
The Gas, Electric Light, Water and Street Railroad Services in New Yorh City (1905) 27
ANNALS 111.
14. The control of local utilities by the state rather than the municipality received
not a little criticism from those who feared that the movement ignored those "wholerome
principles of home rule" which were the foundation of "the American system of democratic
government." Jones, State Versus Local Regulation (1914) 53 As;AXs 94; cf. Smith,
Effect of State Regulation of Public Utilities upon Municipal Home Rule (1914) 53 id. at
85; Wilcox, Effects of State Regulation upon the Municipal Ownership Mov, ment (1914)
53 id. at 71.
15. Even before the decision was rendered in Ex parte Young, while the United States
Supreme Court had the case under consideration, Senator Overman introduced a bill on
February 3, 1908, to prohibit issuance of federal injunctions against state officers. After the
decision was handed down, protests became more vigorous. 42 Conw. Rc 4346-4859 (1903).
After the passage of the Mann-Ellins Act and when the codification of the judicial laws
occupied the attention of Congress, Madison sponsored a bill in the House to the same
effect as the Overman bill. Congressmen Cullop and Hardy led the attack on the "vicious
practice" that had grown up "for the purpose of preventing State courts from con-
struing their own statutes." 46 CONG. REc. 315, 316, 343 (1910).
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tice which resort to the federal courts made possible: a single federal judge,
practically without notice and in an ex parte proceeding, could restrain the en-
forcement of a state statute.16 This element of the problem Congress attempted
to remedy by writing into the Mann-Elkins Act of 191017 the mandatory re-
,quirement of a three-judge federal court where either interlocutory or inter-
locutory and permanent injunctions were sought in cases involving the alleged
repugnancy of state statutes to the federal Constitution. Provision was made
for the expeditious handling of such cases by permitting appeal directly to the
United States Supreme Court from the order granting or denying the inter-
locutory injunction. Reenacted as Section 266 of the Judicial Code,18 the
statute was later amended to include orders of administrative boards and com-
missions.19 At the same time, Congress made some concession to the increas-
ingly vigorous denunciation of a situation which prevented the state courts from
construing their own statutes. A provision was added to Section 266 enabling
state officers to oust the jurisdiction of the inferior federal court by instituting
a suit in the state court and by asking that court to stay the enforcement of
the statute or order until the conclusion of the litigation. The granting of that
stay would automatically stay the proceedings in the federal court. This
amendment, however, had practically no effect, both because of its own inherent
weakness and because the states did not understand just what procedure was
indicated.20 Under it a stay pendente lite had to issue in order to oust the
federal court's jurisdiction even if the order were one that a federal court would
not have stayed. Only four states adapted their procedure so that a stay might
be had as a matter of right in every case.2' In thirty-four other states a dis-
cretionary stay was available,22 and when it was granted the procedure of the
16. Restraining orders could be issued without notice. 17 STAT. 197 (1872). No
limit was provided for the extent of the time of operation of a restraining order, nor,
where such an order had been issued, had provision been made for expediting the hearing
on the motion for injunction, nor for final hearing in most cases where an interlocutory
injunction had been granted. 16 STAT. 176 (1870). See Hutcheson, A Case for Thre
Judges (1934) 47 HAtv. L. REv. 795, 800 et seq.
17. 36 STAT. 557 (1910), 28 U. S. C. A. § 380 (1926). See Louisville and Nashville
Rr. Co. v. Alabama Railroad Commission, 208 Fed. 35, 60 (M. D. Ala. 1913).
18. 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 380 (1926).
19. 37 STAT. 1013 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. § 380 (1926). But ef. Ex parte Collins, 277
U. S. 565 (1928); Ex parte Williams, 277 U. S. 267 (1928) (in both cases the Court
found the statute inapplicable to cases of mere local importance) ; Hutcheson, supra note 16,
at 822. The requirement of a three-judge court was subsequently extended to the hearings
on the permanent injunction when an interlocutory one had already been sought. 43 STAT.
938 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 380 (1926); Moore v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 272 U. S.
317 (1926).
20. Cf. Hutcheson, supra note 16, at 822-825; Lockwood, Maw, and Rosenberry, The
Use of the Federal Injunction in Constitutional Litigation (1930) 43 H~Av. L. Rxv. 426;
Pogue, State Determination of State Law (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 623.
21. Ariz. Laws, 1931, c. 84, § 2; NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§ 20-21, 157; N. Y. Pun.
SERv. LAW (Supp. 1934) § 112; Wis. Stat., 1931, § 285.06.
22. Although discretionary with the court, there are often certain prerequisites to be
complied with before the stay will be granted. In seventeen states a suspending bond
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amended section would have been satisfied. Nevertheless, the common inter-
pretation of the requirement was that for a state court to deprive a federal
court of jurisdiction in any one case it must of necessity be able to grant a stay
in all cases and that to accomplish this each state must make the same legisla-
tive provision as had the other four statesP This was considered too high a
price to pay to keep the suits in the state courts.2-1 Consequently, little came
of the amendment. Only five cases have been found where the federal court
is a condition precedent to a stay order: Ax-%. CODE A=m. (Michie, 192S) §§ 9581, 9333;
CAL. Gra. LAWS (Deering, 1931) act 63S6, § 68(c); CoLO. Az.m. ST.%T. ( Mlls, 1930) §
5933a?(c); ID.ko CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 59-633-59-637; ILL. REv. ST.%T. Am.. (Smith-
Hurd, 1933) c. 111 2/3, § 75; KY.. REv. STAT. Ami. (Supp. 1933) § 66-118(g), (h);
Mlo. STAT. Aim. (1932) § 5235; N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 239 § 19; N. D. Corn'. Laws
Aimx. (Supp. 1925) c. 13B, § 4609c35; Onio CODE Ami. (Page, 1926) § 548; ORa. Co:;sr.,
art. 9, § 21; Oma. CODE Aix. (1930) § 62-137; PA. STAT. A.,.m. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 66, §
832 (rate orders only); T.',". CODE (Will. Shan. & Harsh, 1932) § 9017; Ur,u Rm,. STAT.
Aim. (1933) § 76-6-17; VA. CoN sr. § 156(e) (orders to transportation or transmis-ion com-
panies); VA. CODE (Mlichie, 1930) § 3735 (orders not covered by constitutional provisions:
commission may require bond); WAsH. REV. STAT. Ai m. (Remington, 1932) § 10429. In
three states, courts "may" require suspending bond: N. J. CoMMa. STAT. (Supp. 1924) § 167-
59; PA. STAT. ANmN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 66, § 832 (other than rate orders); W. VA. CODE Aim.
(Michie, 1932) § 24-5-1. In three states the appeal acts as supersedeas unless Court decrees
otherwise: Co-,r. GENr. STAT. (1930) § 3612; R. I. GEN. LA.,WS (1923) § 3698; S. D. Co'..
LAws (1929) § 9591. In four states'there are no restrictions on the courts' di-cretion:
ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford and Moses, Supp. 1927) § 8417z3; LA. G=;. ST,T. (Dart, 1932)
§ 7936; Ass. Aim. LAWS (Lawyers' Co-op., 1933) c. 25, § S (court rules to determine con-
.ditions of stay); VT. Pun. LAws (1933) § 6335. Seven states make notice to commi--ion and
hearing thereon a condition precedent to granting of stay; LNo. STAT. Am.. (Burn% Supp.
1926) § 12751; I, D. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 404; licmi. Coin'. Lmws (1929)
§ 11042; Mb.u. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4651; MoN-r. REv. CODE Az.. (Choate, 1921) §
3906 (public utilities excepting railroads); id. § 3809, which is applicable to railroads, has
been construed to the same effect as § 3906 in State v. District Court, 53 Mont. 229, 163
Pac. 115 (1917); NEv. Coin'. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 6133; Wyo. REv. STAT. A.. (Court-
right, 1931) § 94-164. In Texas there must be notice to commission, hearing, and court
must make specific findings from evidence heard that damage from failure to issue stay
will be irreparable. Txx. Aim. Civ. ST,%T. (Vernon, 1925) art. 6453. In addition to thes2
thirty-four states where the stay is discretionary, in one state supersedeas is automatic upon
filing of a suspending bond, S. C. CODE (M1ichie, 1932) § 8254, and in another the com-
mission may defer the effective date of the order so that its validity may be tested. Iow,
CODE (1931) § 7886 (does not apply to power companies within cities or street railways).
The statutes of only two states prohibit issuance of any stay order: ME. REv. STAT. (1930)
c. 62 § 64; N. C. CODE AiN. (Aichie, 1931) §§ 1066, 1083. In Illinois and Washington no
stay may issue when commisson order merely reinstates a rate that has already been in
effect for at least a year: ILL. REv. STAT. Aim. (Smith-Hurd, 1933) c. 111 2/3, § 75;
WAsH. REv. STAT. Ai-. (Remington, 1932) § 10429.
23. See REPORT OF THE Coin ssoN, NEw YoRr Coznussxo:i oN RmvI'-o: or PI.nuc
SERWvcE CoaN S sioN LAw (1930) 156; Hearings before Cornmzifce on Judidary, House of
Representatives, on S. 752, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 210; cf, Lockwood, Mlaw, and Ro-en-
berry, supra note 20, at 453; Pogue, supra note 20, at 637.
24. Cf. Hutcheson, supra note 16, at 823.
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was successfully ousted from jurisidiction 25 whereas other cases under this pro-
cedure resulted in limitations which robbed it of any of the value which it might
have had. Not only was it held that the stay granted by the state court must
be as broad as that obtainable in the federal court,20 but in the Union Light,
Heat and Power Company2 7 case it was further determined that the amended
section did not apply to cases where temporary restraining orders had been
obtained in the federal courts prior to the state court's stay of the statute or
order.2 8  Under this interpretation, it was possible for the public utilities to
make the provision inoperative by first obeying the commission's order, then
seeking to enjoin its enforcement by going before a one-judge district court,
applying for the convocation of the three-judge statutory court, and asking
for a temporary restraining order.29  Before the utility made this move, the
commission, it was felt, had no grounds for entering the state court for the
purpose of staying its order since there was as yet no controversy. Finally,
since Section 266 applied only to those cases where an interlocutory injunction
alone or an interlocutory and then a permanent injunction was sought and
did not cover cases where merely a permanent injunction was requested,80
there was a vast field of litigation unaffected by the amendment.
Thus before long it was clear that the amended section was not a real remedy.
A further objection had now arisen to the use of the federal injunction. The
purpose of the rule of Ex parte Young had been to secure an easy and early
way of determining the validity of state statutes and administrative orders.
Now the states claimed that at least in public utility rate cases it failed to
achieve this purpose since instead of a saving in time and money, it resulted
25. See Mondovi Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin and Swarth-
out v. Commissioner (Dist. Ct. W. D. Wis. 1932) (titles reversed In circuit court for Dane
County); State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 164 S. C. 208, 213, 162 S. E. 74, 76
(1931) (question of the amount of attorneys' fees which should be paid for the extended
litigation of which the pertinent procedure was only a part); Humble Oil and Refining
Co. v. Allred, Equity No. 438 (W. D. Tex. Nov., 1933); United Gas Public Service Corp.
v. Smith, Equity No. 32 (S. D. Tex. June, 1933) (both mentioned by Hutcheson, supia
note 16, at 822).
26. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Hilton, 274 Fed. 384 (D. Minn. 1921); cf.
Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries, 255 U. S. 288 (1921) (required stay said to be "general").
27. 17 F. (2d) 143 (E. D. Ky. 1926). But in Michigan Public Utilities Commission v.
Michigan State Telephone Co., 228 Mich. 658, 200 N. W. 749 (1924), the state court held
that even after the telephone company had secured an interlocutory injunction in the federal
court and the commission had, thereafter, entered the state court and instituted mandamus
proceedings to enforce their order and requested a stay in compliance with Section 266,
that stay was applicable and timely, and it thereupon became the state court's duty to dis-
pose of the case on the merits since the federal jurisdiction had thus been ousted.
28. The two Texas cases in note 25, supra, refused to follow this reasoning. Hutcheson,
supra note 16, at 825.
29. Cf. REPORT OF THE CoimmissIoN, NEW YORK ComiIssioN ox REsiSoN or PuBLI
SERVIcE CoMIIo LAW (1930) 157 et seq.
30. Moore v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 272 U. S. 317 (1926); Smith v. Wilson, 273 U. S. 388
(1927) ; Ex parte Hobbs, 280 U. S. 168 (1929) ; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Rr., 282
U. S. 10 (1930).
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in a duplication of effort and expense. This argument was predicated upon the
fact that the trial in the federal court was de novo, while in the state court it
was upon the record compiled by the public utility commission.P1 All the
expense and time consumed in the hearings before the commission could be
ignored in the federal courts,3 2 for not only might the commission's record ba
discarded at the request of either party, but, even if both parties had agreed to
its use, the master could still reject it.3 3 The public utilities had no cause to
object to the duplication involved in compiling two records, for it was always
possible for them to shift the cost to the consumers, and no matter who was
the eventual winner in the litigation, the burden of bearing its expense fell on
the people of the state either in the form of increased taxes or increased rates.
Since expense and delay were no drawback to the utilities but would effectively
tie the hands of commissions working on limited budgets, the threat of resort
to the federal courts became a powerful weapon capable of causing a complete
breakdown in commission regulation. For example, the Georgia Public Utility
Commission,3" having on ten successive occasions used up its appropriations in
its own hearings, was forced to withdraw its rate orders as soon as the utilities
went into the federal courts and filed applications for injunctions.
Two different methods of reformation were suggested, as objection to this use
of the federal injunction became more and more vigorous during the last
decade.35 One was aimed simply at the removal of the duplication and re-
31. In only five states is there either a trial de novo, or is evidence so freely admiz-ible
as to permit, in effect, a trial de nova: AmA. CODE A'n. (Michie, 1928) § 9335; low,% Coon
(1931) § 8232; Mo-NT. REV. CODE AN .N. (Choate, 1921) § 3906 (new evidence need not be
transmitted to commission if parties so agree); N. C. CODE Arrx. (Michie, 1931) § 1097,
interpreted by Corporation Comm. v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 185 N. C. 17, 116 S. E. 173 (1923)
to require trial de novo; TENN. CODE (Will. Shan. & Harsh, 1932) § 9014.
32. The New York Public Service Commission spent more than three years in valuing
the property of the New York Telephone Co. Mfore than 2S,000 pages of the commI'-
sion's record was devoted to testimony taken in formal hearings. The federal master
refused to accept this record, and four more years were spent in revaluing the prop.ry.
There were 710 heaings before the master, 609 witnesses, upwards of 36,00D pages of
testimony, and 3,228 exhibits. REPORT or TE Co amrssrx,; NEw Yorm Co-rrissio.x o!.
REvmsIO. or PuBLic SERWvcE Co issiox LAw (1930) 155.
33. Id. at 154. The use of a master in rate cases in federal courts became the rule as a
result of Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167 (1900).
34. Letter of Feb. 23, 1934, from George L. Goode, commissioner of Georgia Public
Service Commison, to Hon. Hatton W. Summers, chairman of judiciary Committee, Hous2
of Representatives. Hearings before Committee on Jtdiciary, House of Representalives on
S. 752, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 269.
35. The following are a list of some of the bills, having the same subject matter, which
were forerunners of the Johnson bill: 67th Cong., 2nd session, H. R. 10212 introduced by
Mr. Bachrach; 69th Cong., 1st session, H. R. 485 by Mr. LaGuardia; 70th Cong., 1st sez~on,
S. 4491 by Mr. Wagner, H. R. 95 by Mr. LaGuardia, H. R. 10759 by Ar. Black, H. R.
13852 by Mr. Dickstein; 71st Cong., 1st session, H. R. 132 and H. R. 135 by Mr. LaGuardia,
H. R. 161 by Mr. O'Connell; 2nd Session S. 3085 by Mr. Wagner, H. R. 9185 by Mr. Dick-
stein, H. R. 9330 by Mr. Bachrach, H. R. 9484 by Mir. Culen, H. R. 9228 and H. R. 9601 by
Mr. Somers; 72nd Cong., Ist session, S. 3243 by Mir. Johnson; 73rd Cong., 1st session, S.
752 by Mr. Johnson and H. R. 53 by Mr. Martin.
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quired that the procedure in the federal courts should be changed so that the
trial should be had on the commission's record. This plan was embodied in
the Lewis Bill,3s endorsed by a majority of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House as a substitute for the Johnson Bill. There are, however, grave
doubts as to the constitutionality of thus making an administrative body's
record the basis of federal judicial review; for the Supreme Court has said that
in cases on administrative orders which raise the issue of constitutionality a
trial de novo must be had if the party aggrieved wants it.87 Furthermore, the
Lewis Bill provided that additional evidence would be admissible in the federal
court, and since there would be nothing to prevent a utility from awaiting
entrance to the federal court before presenting its evidence, basing the federal
trial upon the commission's record would have been but an empty reform. The
other plan, which was to divest the inferior federal courts of jurisdiction over
these cases, is embraced in the Johnson Bill.3 8
Certainly expense and delay will be curtailed by eliminating the duplication
in compiling two records, since state procedure, for the most part, provides
for review on the commission's record.8 1 And even in those states where the
introduction of additional evidence is allowed upon review by a state court, that
evidence must usually first be certified to the commission for its consideration
and action thereon, being reviewed by the court only after it has been incor-
porated into the record.39 That the commission's record may not validly be
36. 78 CoNG. REc. 8328 (1934). The Lewis Bill also provided that although the public
utilities might bring suit in either state or federal courts, having once chosen one, they must
remain there exclusively.
37. 285 U. S. 22 (1932). See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review ol Admin.
istrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact" (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. Rav.
1055; Comment (1932) 46 HAuv. L. REV. 478; Comment (1932) 41 YArE L. J. 1037.
38. During the debates on the Johnson Bill in the Senate, Austen offered an amend-
ment which would have changed the bill into nothing more than a clarified reenactment of
Section 266. To the prerequisite for the Johnson Bill's application, that there be a "plain,
speedy and efficient remedy" in the state courts, Austen would have added the requirement
that such remedy include a stay pendente lite. 78 CoNe. REC. 2238 (1934).
39. In ten states no new evidence is to be received: ARx. Dio. STAT. (Crawford and Mozes,
Supp. 1927) § 8417z3; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 59-629; ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. (Smith-
Hurd, 1933) c. 111 2/3 § 72; Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 5234; NED. Coxi'. STAT.
(1929) § 75-505; N. D. Comnr. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) c. 13B, § 4609c35; Onto GN.
CODE (Page, 1926) § 544; OXIA. CONST. art. 9. § 22; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 9591; VA,
CoNsT. § 156(f) (orders to transportation and transmission companies). In Wyoming no
new evidence is admissible except as to fraud by the commission. Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 119.
In two states only such evidence as had been rejected by commission or was not kept from
commission by lack of diligence or good faith is admissible, but when new evidenco Is
admitted, it must first be transmitted to the commission and court proceedings are
stayed: KAN. RaV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1933) § 66-118(f); N. H. Pun. LAws (1926) c. 239,
§ 12. In eight states new evidence is freely admissible but procedure outlined above must
be followed: IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, 1926) § 12752; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) §§
7934, 7935; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 405; Micx. Comn. LAWS ANN.
(1929) § 11042; NEy. ComP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 6133; ORE. CODE ANN. (.1930) §
62-138; R. I. GaN. LAWS (1923) § 3700 (if court thinks it of sufficient importance) ; Wis.
STAT. (1931) § 196-44.
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the basis for state court review is, it is true, a slight possibility in view of the
rule of Crowell v. Benson.37 There the Supreme Court held that where the
orders of a federal commission raise the issue of constitutionality, a judicial
trial de novo must be had upon the constitutional issue if the aggrieved party
desires it. There is, however, no logical compulsion upon state courts to adopt
a similar view, since the Supreme Court based its reasoning upon Article I
of the Constitution and the implied doctrine of the separation of powers of
the federal government rather than upon the Fifth amendment. Since the con-
stitutions of most of the states have provisions similar to those of Article III,
the rule is persuasive upon them as to the ights and disabilities of their own
separated governmental departments. But it is not mandatory as it would
have been had the Supreme Court decided the case upon the authority of the
due process clause.40 Yet, as Mr. Justice Brandeis indicates in a note to his
dissent,41 there is an unhappy obiter in the majority opinion classifying cases
which involve the question of confiscation as typical of the type of controversy
that requires a trial de novo on the constitutional issue.- However, should
this same rule be extended to state procedure, the Johnson Bill will have accom-
plished little towards minimizing the expense and delay.
3
The fear that divesting the federal courts of this jurisdiction will create a
situation where the public utilities would be insufficiently protected from hostile
state sentiment and local prejudice4" is hardly well founded. 'What hostility
has existed in recent years has mainly been the result of the effect of expensive,
long drawn-out litigation in the federal courts, the utilities' distrust of the
state courts, and their occasional indifference to the orders of the public service
commission. 45 With the elimination of this great cause for prejudice, it is not
illogical to expect that the state's desire to secure for the public as inexpensive
service as possible will be offset by the need to assure the existence of efficient
and continuous service, thus guaranteeing treatment in which the interests of all
parties will be adequately protected.
If, nevertheless, public sentiment should so influence a state forum as to
render a fair trial unobtainable in particular instances, the utilities will still have
an appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of the United States under Section
237a of the Judicial Code. 4 That this eventual review should be ample pro-
40. See comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1037, 1047.
41. 285 U. S. at 92, n. 28.
42. 285 U. S. at 60.
43. It should be remembered as well that state procedure sometimes requires resort
to one or two more courts than the procedure under Section 266 demands. But see note 69,
infra.
44. Hearings, supra note 23, at 170-173; 78 CoNG. REc. 2015-2022 (1934).
45. Cf. FRAxrURTER, THE PUBLIC An ITs GovE RT (1930) c. 3; see d&-ent of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commion, 262 U.
S. 276, 308 (1923).
46. 36 STAT. 1156 (1911) [as amended 43 STAT. 937 (1925)], 28 U. S. C. A. § 344
(1926). For jurisdictional purposes, the order of a state regulatory commission is treated
as an act of the legislature. Lake Erie and Western Rr. v. State Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 249 U. S. 422 (1919), cases cited at 424. In those states where admittance as
1934]
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tection would seem to be clearly shown by some of the very arguments ad-
vanced by the utilities against the Johnson Bill. It was claimed that resort to
the federal courts was had only in those important cases where protection from
local prejudice was necessary. 47 Yet according to their own figures,48 in
seventy-five per cent of the cases where the federal procedure was followed, the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was invoked before an end was made to the
litigation.
State court review is substantively as sufficient as that formerly obtainable
in the inferior federal courts, for under the Ben Avon4* rule a state statute is
unconstitutional which does not provide for review of both the law and the
facts where there is any question of confiscation, so that the court's determina-
tion may be based upon its own independent judgment of both law and fact.
The commission's findings may be presumptively correct but cannot be con-
clusive upon the court without contravening the due process clause. It is not
enough that there should be some evidence in the record to support the findings
of the commission, but the court may weigh the probative force of the
evidence. 0
Although the Johnson Bill thus does not seem to work a hardship upon the
utilities, attacks on its validity may be expected. That Congress has the power
so to limit the jurisdiction of the district courts is no longer open to doubt.
Federal Judicial power and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court are derived di-
rectly from the Constitution and, therefore, are not subject to legislative altera-
tion. But the jurisdiction of every other federal court comes from the authority of
Congress, which may restrict or expand it subject to the one limitation that it
be not extended beyond the constitutional boundaries."' The Johnson Bill
of right to the highest court of the state is precluded by a unanimous decision in the Inter-
mediate appellate court, appeal will be permitted directly from the intermediate court
to the United States Supreme Court if the highest state court refuses to review. Gregory
v. McVeigh, 90 U. S. 294 (1874); Norfolk Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264 (1912).
47. Hearings Before Subcommittee on Judiciary on S. 937, S. 939 and S. 3243, 72d
Cong., 1st sess. (1932) 57-63. The last numbered bill was practically identical to the
Johnson Bill.
48. These figures are set forth in three articles by Spurr, appearing in: (July 24, 1930)
6 P. U. FonR. 67-76; (October 2, 1930) id. at 395-404; (October 16, 1930) id. at 451-461.
49. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
50. The doctrine has been reaffirmed many times. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312
(1921); Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U. S. 43 (1923); Tagg Brothers
and Moorehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U. S. 589 (1931); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
51. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); cf. Turner v. Bank of
North America, 4 U. S. 8 (1799); Fishback v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 161 U. S. 96
(1896).
For the merits of the question of limiting federal jurisdiction, see Frankfurter, Distribu-
tion of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CorX. L. Q. 499;
dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow
Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532 (1928). It is interesting to note that Senator Logan of
Kentucky, counsel for the plaintiff in that case, spoke in opposition to the Johnson Bill
in the debates in the Senate. 78 CONG. REc. 2238-2243 (1934).
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makes no change in the extent of the power of the federal judiciary inasmuch
as the United States Supreme Court will still retain appellate review of the
state courts.5 2  Nor does it seem that an attack on the bill as discriminatory
legislation 53 against the public utilities, violating the Fifth Amendment, would
be any more successful. The unique characteristics of public utility cases, in-
volving as they do complex problems of economic and social importancei
the money and time expended in their determination, and the application to
them of rules of law that do not obtain in cognate situations 5 are ample proof
that such a classification has a reasonable basis in fact and is neither arbitrary
nor capricious. Furthermore, due process of law does not guarantee any par-
ticular type of judicial review in preference to any other.50
The phrasing of the bill suggests the further possibility of interpretative liti-
gation. By its terms, it divests the federal district courts of jurisdiction only
where there is a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy available in the state
courts.5 7 Although all states having commission regulationsPs have provided
for judicial review of rate orders,*0 there are three which still make the com-
52. Argument was heard in Congress that since the word "all" was to be found in the
clause of the Constitution "The judicial power shall extend to all cases ... arising under
the constitution" and did not appear in the phrase referring to diversity of citizeasip
cases, it followed that the jurisdiction of the federal courts could be limited with respect
to the latter but not in regard to the former. Aside from the fact that this reasoning
substitutes "jurisdiction" for "judicial power," it is faulty in another respect, for if Con-
gress has the power to divest the inferior federal courts of all their jurisdiction, a fortiori,
it has the power to divest them of part of it. Cf. The Assessors v. O-bornes, 76 U. S.
567 (1869).
53. Although the Fifth Amendment does not expressy guarantee equal protection of
the laws as does the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless, the limitation upon federal
legislation has been held, by judicial interpretation, to include classifications so arbitray
and capricious as to amount to discrimination. United States v. Yount, 267 Fed. 861
(W. D. Pa. 1920).
54. Cf. FRAxnr xAN D LAwirs, THE Busnzss or = Surr CounTr (1927) 153,
and authorities cited, n. 34.
5. E.g. rules of valuation and methods of determining fair value: Smyth v. Ames,
169 U. S. 466 (1898); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913). Depreciation: Knox-
ville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 (1909); United Railways v. West, 220 U. S.
234 (1930). Also see Hearings, supra note 23, at 242-246; dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 75 (1932).
56. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884); Reetz v. Michigan, 1SS U. S. S05
(1903); United States v. Heinze, 218 U. S. 532 (1910).
57. No persuasive reason was suggested in the Congressional debates for the use of
the word "effident" rather than the more usual "adequate." The cause, however, was
probably the desire to escape the very broad interpretations given the latter by the courts.
"Adequate" carries with it a suggestion of comparison which would be an unwarranted
burden on the legislation. For e-xample, the presence of an "adequate" remedy in the
state courts might be judged by whether such forums could issue a stay as broad as in the
federal courts. The designers of the bill seemed to have had this in mind and wished to
eliminate the possibility of such issues arising. Cf. 78 Co.o. Rr. 2020 (1934).
58. Delaware alone has no commission regulation.
59. Only in Florida, Georgia, and Kentucky, are there no legislative provisions for
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mission's findings of fact final upon the court.60 That such a review is deemed
by the Supreme Court to be "inefficient" was definitely proven by the Ben
Avon case; thus it is probable that review under those statutes would fail to
satisfy the bill's requirement. Moreover, what is necessary in the matter of a
stay of the commission's order pendente lite offers another opportunity to test
the efficiency of the state court's remedy. When the commission's order must
remain in force during the judicial investigation, the requirements could scarcely
be held fulfilled in the light of Porter v. Investors' Syndicate"' where it was
said that such a statutory provision would surely be unconstitutional. But
where the state court has the power to grant a stay in its discretion and does
so, no difficulties should arise; for the proceedings would be directly analogous
to those under the amended Section 266. Further, where a stay is permitted in
the discretion of the state court but none is granted, two factors would militate
against a utility's entrance to the federal court through a claim of the ineffi-
ciency of the state procedure. First, the state trial having already been initiated,
the utility might run afoul of the prohibition against a federal court's injunction
of a state court's proceedings, and, secondly, a single district judge's authority
would seem to extend only to a formal inquiry as to whether the state court
had the discretionary power to issue a stay and not as to whether its refusal
was an abuse of discretion.62 Hence, state court procedure should fail to meet
the requirement only in those states which prohibit the issuance of any stay.
A further problem might arise as to the sufficiency of the judicial review in
Virginia and Oklahoma where the state supreme courts are empowered to enter-
tain appeals from a commission order and upon finding them unreasonable in
certain cases to set different rates.6 3 In the Prentis4 case a federal injunction,
sought before the state court had thus acted, was held to be premature on the
ground that the setting of a rate by a court was a legislative function that must
be completed before resort could be had to the federal judiciary. A possible im-
plication of this holding is that a federal court might enjoin the enforcement of
the state supreme court's order for it would not be acting as a court but as a
commission. Under this interpretation, it might be claimed that no state judicial
judicial review, but in Florida and Georgia the appropriate methods of review have
been pointed out by court decisions. Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Commissioners,
100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876 (1930); Georgia Public Service Commission v. Atlanta and
West Point Rr., 164 Ga. 822, 139 S. E. 725 (1927). And in Kentucky, provision Is made
for review if the commission seeks to enforce its order: Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §§ 201e-17,
201g-11.
60. CoLO. AN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 5933zl; Me. Laws 1933, c. 6; UTta REV. STAT.
Axx. (1933) §§ 76-6-16.
61. 286 U. S. 461, 471 (1932).
62. The inquiry as to whether a three-judge court would have jurisdiction would be
made by a single judge. Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 (1933). Since the statutory court's
jurisdiction is based upon the absence of a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" In the
state courts, the availability and not the actual use of the remedy would be the jurisdictional
question.
63. VA. CoNsT. § 156 (g) (transportation and transmission companies); OKLA. CONST.
art. 9, § 23 (transportation and transmission companies).
64. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
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review existed at all. But the problem may be approached from another angle.
Although it could be said that if the state supreme court were acting legislatively
the United States Supreme Court could take the case neither on appeal, since it
can review only judgments, nor as an original case, since its original jurisdic-
tion does not extend to cases of this sort,65 nevertheless, it is likely that where
the state supreme court merely affirmed or denied the commission's order, it
would be considered to have acted in a judicial manner. And where the state
court had revised the order, it could be deemed first legislatively to have set
the rate and then judicially affirmed the rate's reasonableness. Under this
rationalization, the United States Supreme Court would be enabled to review
the judicial part of the state court's double function and the state courts would
have provided adequate judicial review to comply with the terms of the bill.
Whether or not the bill extends to rates regulated by state statutes rather
than by commission orders might present yet another problem. It has been
the judicial interpretation of statutory rate regulation which the United States
Supreme Court has considered more properly within the jurisdiction of the
state judiciary than of the federal. 6  Moreover, the distinction between statutes
regulating rates and commission orders is rendered merely verbal because of
the procedure under which the cases arise. If a public utility is dissatisfied
with the statutory rate, it submits its arguments to the public utility commission,
and if the commission after a hearing decides against the utility's contention, it
orders continued obedience to the statute. It is this order which the utility
may be said to be enjoining, and the case would thus fall within the bill. The
requirement that a "hearing" must be had upon rate orders would otherwise
eliminate state statutes, for the meaning of the word could not be stretched
to the perfunctory examination of witnesses which may precede the enactment
of a state statute; "hearing" rather refers to the formal procedure followed
by administrative boards in determining the rate for specific utilities.
One case involving the interpretation of the requirement that the rate order
to be within the bill must issue only after a "hearing," has already arisen. In
Georgia Continental Telephone Compatny v. Georgia Public Scrvice Commis-
sion67 a three-judge federal court dismissed a prayer for an interlocutory injunc-
tion on the ground that the Johnson Bill had divested it of jurisdiction, despite
the utility's claim that the order had issued out of an unreasonable hearing.
The utility contended that the commissioners acted under duress because the
governor had appointed them after announcing that he would appoint only com-
missioners who would reduce the rates. The court followed the complainant's
interpretation that the "hearing" must be reasonable63 but held that public
officers will be presumed to have acted honestly unless proven otherwise and
that, therefore, the hearing was not unreasonable.
Apart from the Johnson Bill's effectiveness in achieving its purposes of
permitting the states the first opportunity of construing the validity of their
65. Cf. Federal Radio Commisson v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930).
66. Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929).
67. U. S. L. Week, Aug. 21, 1934, at 1048, col. 1.
68. Senator Johnson stated in the debates on the bill that the requirement was merely
of a "hearing" and not a "reasonable hearing!' 78 Coxo. Rrc 2020 (1934).
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own orders and in minimizing the expense and delay of rate regulation, other
beneficial results may be expected. The former procedure, depriving the com-
missions in part of the function of rate-making and conferring the power upon
the federal master, had undermined the authority of the commissions. With
this changed under the Johnson Bill, the commissions should improve in
personnel and ability as their power is increased; and, now that the utilities
can only hurt their cause by withholding evidence from the commissions, the
records made before those bodies should more completely reflect the conten-
tions of both sides. State procedure, too, should further improve in efficiency
now that resort to the federal courts is impossible and an incentive exists for
the states to expedite the handling of these cases so that their jurisdiction may
not be defeated for lack of an "efficient" remedy. Any movement towards im-
provement should now be aided by the influential and powerful backing of the
utilities themselves. Already twenty-seven states69 have provided that review
of rate orders should be directly by the state supreme court or by one particular
lower court, and it is reasonable to expect that other states will designate special
courts for the exclusive hearing of these cases, with judges whose speed and
efficiency in handling them will be rapidly augmented through experience.
One source of concern in Congress when the Johnson Bill was tinder
discussion was the oft-repeated assertion that the bill was an opening wedge
in a movement to abolish entirely the inferior federal courts.10 Congressional
halls have resounded to that cry too many times for it to have had much
influence upon the decision of the legislators. The scope of the jurisdiction of
those courts has been changed so frequently that if such a movement exists, the
opening blow was struck many years ago. 71 If it is necessary, however, to
delineate the Johnson Bill as a part of any movement. it would seem to be a
69. In sixteen states the review is directly by the Supreme Court. CAL,. Gm. LAWS
(Deering, Supp. 1933) act 6386, § 67; CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 5933zl; I[AIDO
CODE ANNi. (1932) § 59-627; ME. R.xv. STAT. (1930) c. 62, § 63; MASS. ANx. LAWS (Law-
yers Co-op., 1933) c. 25, § 5; NEB. Comix. STAT. (1929) § 75-505; N. H. Pun. LAWS (1926)
c. 239, § 4; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 134-1118; OMO CODE AN. (Page, 1926) § 544;
OKLA. CONST. art. 9, § 20; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 3697; S. D. COMP. LAWS (1929)
§ 9591; UTAu REy. STAT. ANy;. (1933) § 76-6-16; VT. Pun. LAws (1933) § 6063; VA.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 3734 and VA. CONsT. § 156(d); W VA. CODE ANN. (1931) § 24-S-1.
In eleven states a single specified lower court has exclusive jurisdiction: ALA. CODE AnN.
(Michie, 1928) § 9831 (Common carriers); Amnz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckneyer, 1928)
§ 720; ARx. Dio. STAT. (Crawford and Moses, Supp. 1927) § 8417z3; LA. Gma. STAT.
(Dart, 1932) § 7937; MIcH. Comai. LAws (1929) § 11042; N. Y. Puu. SEar, LAW (Supp.
1934) § 112; ORE. CODE AN. (1930) § 62-136; S. C. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 8254(e);
Tzx. AnN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 6453; Wis. STAT. (1931) §§ 196.41, 285.06;
Wyo. Laws, 1933, c. 119 and Wyo. Rav. STAT. AxN. (Courtright, 1931) § 94-164.
70. 78 CONG. REc. 2092, 2093 (1934).
71. Senator Norris has advocated complete abolition of diversity of citizenship juris-
diction for many years. For expression of opposing views on this problem, cf. Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN.
L. Q. 499; Yntema and Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction (1931)
79 U. or PA. L. R.Ev. 869; Frankfurter, A Note on Diversity Jurisdiction-In Reply to
Professor Yntema (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 1097.
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better classification to consider it a part of the movement to invest authority
in those persons or bodies whose positions render them the most responsive to
the societal and economic elements of the problem.
INTERSTATE COMERCE CO1BTHSSION CONTROL OF
INTRASTATE RATES
THE incidence of the depression on our transportation system calls attention
again to the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over intrastate
rates, the field of a memorable struggle in past years over the division of state
and federal power.' No less than four opinions of the Supreme Court in cases
decided in last year's term undertook to elucidate what was thought to have
been settled by the Transportation Act of 1920. One of the effects of this Act
was to amend the 1887 Act to Regulate Commerce by the insertion of Section
13(4) which, virtually enacting the holding of the Shreveport case 2 empowers
the Commission after proper hearing to change any rate fixed under state
authority whenever it "finds that any such rate . . . causes any undue . . .
preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate com-
merce on the one hand and interstate ... commerce on the other hand, or unjust
discrimination against interstate ... commerce," 3 the action of any state au-
thority to the contrary notwithstanding. Three factors combine to give this
provision current importance. The loss in revenues that has accompanied de-
clining traffic has led the main trunk line carriers to seek horizontal rate
increases that have met with strenuous local opposition. These roads have
attempted to hold the rate structure high, claiming the right to an oppor-
tunity to earn a fair return on their property. They have felt the double burden
of excessively high interest charges and of the effort to comply with Presidential
appeals to keep wage payments up. Yet pursued to its natural conclusion, their
rate policy is at once logically absurd and suicidal-absurd because it demands
that the smaller the volume of traffic the higher the level of rates must be,
ad infinitum; suicidal because the higher the level of rates the greater the
incentive to shippers to resort to competing means of transportation, to trucks,
pipe lines and water carriers. For the short term, however, it has seemed to
the larger railroads the preferable choice of evils. Independently of this, local
shippers, often aided by state regulatory bodies, have sought reductions in
particular local rates in a desperate effort to retain their shares of a diminish-
ing volume of business. They are urging that their own salvation, and that
1. An excellent recent discussion, both historical and analytical, will be found in 2
SnAiurarn, Ta LNTERSTATE Co:MEfcE Com nssro: (1931) 191-247, 269-307, 331-344.
See also Peyser, Authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission over Intrastate Rates
(1928) 17 Go. L. J. 39; Cox, The Dual Regulation of Commerce Under the Amended 13th
Section of the Act to Regulate Cominnrce (1931) 19 Ky. L. J. 312; Swenson, The Paszing
of the State Commerce Power (1933) 8 TEmxLE L. Q. 53.
2. Houston, East and West Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
3. 41 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 13 (4) (1929).
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of the carriers as well, depends upon the reduction of rates to a level where
the volume of traffic will increase-if such a level there is. Finally, even the
large carriers have been obliged by local competition to make substantial
reductions at competitive points for the sake of diverting a little traffic to
their own rails, although they have usually been unwilling to extend these
reductions generally. The Commission thus is the forum where, with increasing
bitterness, these two diametrically opposed views of a proper railroad rate
policy in a time of depression have been urged. The attitude of the Com-
mission and of the courts in dealing with this issue of public policy received
a searching test in a case decided on the last day of the Supreme Court's 1933
term, Ohio v. United States.
4
In the last eleven years no question of the constitutionality of the Commis-
sion's power has been raised. Consequently the current redefinitions of the
line between federal and state power in this field is to be found in the practice
of the Commission itself. There it appears that although the Commission
has not attempted in recent years to enlarge its powers, it has sided with the
major trunk lines in formulating its policy, and has been supported by the
courts in so doing. Since the depression began, the Commission has on one
occasion granted a substantial part of a request from the carriers for a general
increase5 and two years later entirely denied the united request of the largest
shippers' organization for a general decrease. 6 A third and more critical test,
another railroad petition for a general increase, is now in the stage of hearings
before the Commission.' The frequency with which its decisions have been
challenged in the courts during the past year indicates an increased unwilling-
ness of litigants to be content with its orders, and a determined attempt to
bring about a change in its rate policy.8
The Commission's control of intrastate rates has evolved from dealings with
three general types of cases, although of course overlappings are to be found.
All three types illustrate a trend toward greater uniformity in the rate structure
and toward an increased national power. The first of these, known as the
"discrimination" cases, is the type made familiar by the Shreveport case- of a
discrimination between two localities. There the intrastate rate to one locality
fixed by the state authority was found to be unduly preferential as compared
with the interstate rate to the other. This was held to violate Section 3 of the
original Interstate Commerce Act, forbidding undue preference and prejudice
generally,9 and to give the Interstate Commerce Commission power to raise
the state rate to eliminate the preference. Subsequently the Transportation
4. 292 U. S. 498 (1934).
S. The Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 I. C. C. 539 (1931), 179 I. C. C. 215 (1931),
191 I. C. C. 361 (1933).
6. General Rate Level Investigation, 195 1. C. C. 5 (1933).
7. Ex Parte 115, Increase in Freight Charges, 1934.
8. Of six decisions of the Supreme Court in its 1933 term involving the Transportation
Act the following four dealt with section 13: United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70
(1934); Florida v. United States, 292 U. S. 1 (1934); Illinois Commerce Commlssion v.
United States, 292 U. S. 474 (1934); Ohio v. United States, 292 U. S. 498 (1934).
9. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3 (1) (1929).
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Act of 1920, without changing Section 3, defined the Commission's power in
this type of case more specifically by adding Section 13(4) to the Interstate
Commerce Act.10 Thus under two sections of the Act these cases may be
adjusted by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Such discrimination cases
are still common. 1 The remedy is dear, but strictly limited. In proceedings
under Section 3 alone both the prejudiced and the preferred localities must
be served by the same railroad system.12  This is not necessary where Section
13 is invoked, but in the latter event a showing that the prejudiced interstate
rate is reasonable is also required.' 3 More important, in this type of case under
either section actual damage as a result of the discrimination must be proved
and the intrastate rates may be raised only to or from the localities definitely
shown to be preferred.' 4  Rates throughout a state, that is to say, may not be
10. At the same time, however, it changed the remedial procedure by providing in
paragraph 3 of the same section that the state commiions affected be allowed to sit with
the Interstate Commerce Commison in the hearings in such cases for the purpose of pre-
senting the state's viewpoint and of encouraging harmonious action by the two authorities.
The state commi-oners have no vote in these joint proceedings.
11. They make up the bulk of the cases cited under "State Rates and Regulation" in 2
LuST, CosoLrmA=rD DioEsT or DEcIoNs UNDER THz INT=sTATz Coomcm Acrs (192S)
1841-1882; 3 id. (1927) 1149-1169; 4 id. (1928) 1139-1148; 5 id. (1930) 1192-1204; 6 id.
(1932) 755-765.
12. If more than one carrier serves the two localities, each road must participate in
the hauls to or from both points before liability under Section 3 can be established. Ashland
Fire Brick Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 115 (1911); Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v.
United States, 289 U. S. 627 (1933); see MAmsr=M, THE L%= CArco Co.%L Ra= CoN;-
TRovERsY (1932) c. 7; Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 297.
13. State Corporation Commission of Virginia v. Abardeen and Rockfissh Rr. Co., 136
I. C. C. 173 (1927), 161 I. C. C. 273 (1930), 165 I. C. C. 31 (1930), 169 I. C. C. 723
(1930), was an important recent case illustrating the effect of this limitation. The federal
Commission there declined to raise the rates within Virginia to the level of Virginia-North
Carolina rates on the ground of discrimination between localities, in the abzence of a
showing of reasonableness of the interstate rates.
The Commission's power over such discriminations extends to intrastate electric inter-
urban carriers as well as to steam railroads. United States v. Vllage of Hubbard, 265
U. S. 474 (1925), rev'g 278 Fed. 754 and 769 (N. D. Ohio 1922). It is worth noting
that this decision provoked from Mr. Justice McReynolds the only dissent in the entire
series of cases dealing with Section 13.
14. In Illinois Central Rr. Co. v. Public Utilities Commision of Illinois, 245 U. S. 493
(1918), the Interstate Commerce Commission had previously found discrimination in intra-
state passenger rates, based on evidence restricted to the East St. Louis region, in Buzine-s
Men's League v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 41 I. C. C. 13 (1916). When the
carriers attempted to make this the ground for a general increase in Illinois passnger fares
the state commission refused its permission. On appeal the Supreme Court criticized
the Interstate Commerce Commission's report for its indefinite scope and found it an
insufficient justification for the carriers' refusal to obey the state commison.
But a little earlier an order of the Commission in Traffic Bureau v. American Expr,-
Company, 39 I. C. C. 703 (1916), finding discrimination in South Dakota express rates,
was sustained, although based on evidence limited to Sioux City, Iowa, and five cities in
South Dakota, American Express Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617
(1917). Mr. Justice Brandeis for the Court, following the Shreveport case, criticized
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raised on a showing of preference at a few localities in the state.10
A second type, called "revenue" cases, has resulted from the power granted
to the Commission in 1920 by the last clause of Section 13(4) forbidding
"unjust discrimination against interstate . . . commerce." This clause was
interpreted by the Commission to include the power to change intrastate rates
when they had been set at such a level as to cause undue loss of revenue to
interstate carriers. The constitutionality of this power was sustained in Rail-
road Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad
Company 0 in 1922. There the failure of intrastate rates to contribute a fair
share toward the revenues of the railroads as a whole was interpreted to be
within the meaning of "unjust discrimination.' 7 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Taft dwelt on the so-called "dove-tail relationship" supposed to exist
between Section 13 and Section 15a,18 which guarantees the carriers in any rate
the Commission's order for indefiniteness in scope, but reading the order in connection
with the report concluded that it was intended to be limited to the area where evidence
of discrimination was shown.
More recently, in Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931), rev'g 30 F. (2d) 116
(N. D. Ga. 1929), 31 id. 580 (N. D. Ga. 1929), the Court set aside an Interstate Commerce
Commission order raising the rates on logs "within and throughout the entire state of
Florida," Georgia Public Service Commission v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co., 146 I. C. C.
717 (1928), because the evidence of actual discrimination was limited to interstate rates
from points in northern Florida only. But see text, inira p. 138.
15. The Commission is also limited to fixing the intrastate rate not higher than the
then existing interstate rate. It may not order that the intrastate rate shall move up
or down with the interstate rate in the future, but must in such a case make a new order
based upon new findings of discrimination; for otherwise the states would soon lose per-
manently all control of intrastate rates. Georgia Public Service Commission v. United
State, 283 U. S. 765 (1931); Alabama v. United States, 283 U. S. 776 (1931).
16. 257 U. S. 563 (1922), sustaining Wisconsin Passenger Fares, 59 I. C. C. 391 (1920),
For comments see LocxK=nz, RAI OAD RUGuLmonN SiNcE 1920 (1928) 55-98; Comment
(1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 864; Note (1922) 71 U. or PA. L. lRav. 11; (1922) 2 Wis. L. Riw
56; Note (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 870.
17. In New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591 (1922), sustaining Rates, Fares and
Charges of the New York Central Rr. Co., 59 I. C. C. 290 (1920), and Iowa Passenger Fares
and Charges. 60 id. at 55 (1921), which was decided the same day as, and on the authority
of, the Wisconsin case, the situation was complicated by a contract embodied in the state's
charter to the New York Central providing for a two-cent-a-mile passenger fare within the
state. This contract was declared abrogated by the federal action. The case also differed
from the Wisconsin case in that the state of New York was the direct appellant and so was
allowed to attack the basis of the Commission's findings, whereas in the Wisconsin case the
Commission's order was subject to collateral attack only, and consequently the Court de-
clined to investigate the evidence for the order.
Section 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 387 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 22
(1) (1929), which allows reduced rates or free transportation for the property of federal,
state, or municipal governmental authorities, was also held to be permissive only, and not
to prevent the Commission from raising such intrastate rates where substantial discrimina-
tion was shown to result. Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis v. Tennessee, 262 U. S.
318 (1923), rev'g 284 Fed. 371 (M. D. Tenn. 1922), and sustaining Tennecee Rates and
Charges, 63 I. C. C. 160 (1921).
18. 41 STAT. 488 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15a (1929).
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territory a level of rates high enough to enable them as a whole to earn a fair
return, and pointed out that unless the Commission had such a power, indi-
vidual states might nullify this purpose by keeping state rates below the
interstate level.19 Once upheld by the Court, the Commission proceeded to
use its new power firmly to secure a uniform application of the large freight
and passenger increases granted in Increased Rates, 1920.20 Again, following
the Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931.21 a number of recalcitrant state authorities
were forced into line in Increases in Intrastate Ratesi- over the protest of a
dissenting minority of the Commission. One of these states, Louisiana, car-
ried its objections unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court.p
The character of the evidence required in "revenue" cases differs essentially
from that required to prove discrimination between localities. A disparity
between state and interstate rates must be shown, it is true. But on the one
hand it is not necessary to show that each individual intrastate rate results in
actual prejudice,24 and on the other hand it is necessary to prove that the
19. For the effect of the repeal of this rule of rate making and the subrtitution of
another rule by the Emergency Transportation Act, 48 STAT. 220 (1933), 49 U. S. C. A.
§ 15a (2) (1933), in the light of this argument about a "dovetail" relationship, see Florida v.
United States, 292 U. S. 1 (1934). Evidently the argument was only a rationalization;
for though the guarantee of an opportunity for a fair return no longer exists, the Court
showed no disposition in the Florida case to accede to the argument of counsd that it
reverse its conclusions in the Wisconsin case. Even though the literal basis of its logic
in the latter case has been removed, the substance of it remains.
20. 58 I. C. C. 220 (1920). In the opinion of Smnau., op. cit. supra note 1, at
292-301, and cases there cited, the Commission used its power with unnecz-ary harsh-
ness to enforce intrastate conformity with the results of this decision. A number of the
states carried their protests to the Courts but the Commission w'as uniformly upheld. See
the cases cited supra notes 16, 17 and infra note 31; d. Lusr, op. cit. supra note 11.
21. 178 I. C. C. 539 (1931), 179 id. at 215 (1931), 191 id. at 361 (1933).
22. 186 I. C. C. 615 (1932). The Commission applied with a few exceptions the inter-
state increases allowed in the Fifteen Per Cent Case, 1931, to about a dozen states where
they had been denied in whole or in part. A minority of the Commimon urged that
as the Commission itself in that case had not allowed the flat 1S% increase Fased for,
but had exercised its discretion in granting specific increases on named commodities while
denying any increases on others, it should not now prevent the state authorities from
exercising a similar discretion based upon a more intimate acquaintance with local condi-
tions. See separate and dissenting opinions, 186 I. C. C. 615, 664, 666, 667 (1932), and
Commissioner Eastman's dissent in Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal in Ohio, 192
I. C. C. 413, 453 (1933) ; see text, ifra, p....
23. United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70 (1933), rev'g 2 F. Supp. 545 (E. D. La.
1932). It was urged on behalf of the state that before the Commission could raise state-
wide rates it must first find each interstate rate reasonable and must find that the increas-l
intrastate rates would raise the carrier's revenues by an appreciable amount.
24. In all of its orders for statewide increases in state rates the Commisson has adopted
the practice of inserting a saving clause which allows state authorities and other parties
in interest to apply for modification of the order later as to any particular rates that
can be shown not to result in discrimination against interstate commerce, or to be unrelated
thereto. See for example Wisconsin Passenger Fares, 59 L C. C. 391, 397 (1920), noted with
approval in Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Rr.
Co., 257 U. S. 563, 579 (1922). Little advantage has been taken of the opportunity thus
afforded. SiuarAw, op. cit. supra note 1, at 301.
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lower intrastate rates result in a loss of revenue to the carrier which unduly
burdens the interstate traffic. A neat illustration of this difference is the first
Florida Log Case.25 The Supreme Court there set aside an order of the Com-
mission that all Florida intrastate log rates must be raised, for want of evi-
dence as to the effect of the rates outside the northern Florida region. The
Commission then proceeded to turn what had been a discrimination case into
a revenue case. It held additional hearings, estimated the loss resulting from
the lower intrastate rates, and on that basis reaffirmed its original conclusions.
This time the Commission was upheld by the Supreme Court, 0 and thus was
allowed to do for one reason precisely what it had been forbidden to do for
another reason.
Decisions in revenue cases rest in an unusual degree upon human judgment.
The effect upon revenues of a change in rates depends upon the volume of
traffic subsequently realized, and this cannot be accurately foretold. Conse-
quently, the new power of the Commission involves a large transfer of discre-
tion to that body from carrier managements and state authorities. With the
power has gone a feeling of responsibility, and it is not too much to say that
this has been an important factor in bringing about a noteworthy change in
the Commission's view of its own duties. Whereas twenty years ago its func-
tion was conceived primarily as that of protecting the shipping public against
unreasonable exactions of the railroads, today its conception of the public
has been expanded to include the railroads and it has become one of the chief
guardians of their welfare. Particularly since the depression has it taken a
conservative view of rate cases and has done everything in its power to pre-
serve carrier revenues.
27
The third type of case, less clearly defined than the others, rests upon the
same prohibition of "unjust discrimination against interstate .. .commerce."
The clause has lately been broadly interpreted to empower the Commission
to require uniformity in rates where a long established set of rate relationships
has been embodied in a single rate structure in which state and interstate rates
are so closely mingled as to form an indivisible whole. This has been upheld
even though it cannot be shown that each individual intrastate rate causes
prejudice to an interstate shipper, or that additional revenues from the intra-
state business are needed. In such cases, to allow the accident of a state
line to disturb these relationships would upset the large volume of traffic
built upon the existing order, and so would burden the interstate commerce
involved. Illinois Commerce Commission v. United States28 illustrates this
type of case. The Interstate Commerce Commission had fixed a new and
25. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931), rev'g 30 F. (2d) 116 (N. D. Ga. 1929),
31 id. at 580 (N. D. Ga. 1929), and setting aside the order in Georgia Public Service
Commission v. Atlantic Coast Line Rr. Co., 146 I. C. C. 717 (1928).
26. 292 U. S. 1 (1934), aff'g 4 F. Supp. 477 (N. D. Ga. 1933) and sustaining 186
I. C. C. 157 (1932), 190 id. at 588 (1933). Cf. note 19, supra.
27. See the discussions of the financial situation of the carriers in the CoznrnssIoN's
AsNruAL REPoRTs for the past three years.
28. 292 U. S. 474 (1934), sustaining Switching Rates in the. Chicago District, 177
I. C. C. 669 (1931).
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higher level of rates for switching in the Chicago district, which covers the
industrial area around the city and includes a portion of Indiana. When the
Illinois Commission refused to allow the same increases on the traffic that did
not cross the Indiana line, the Interstate Commerce Commission required them to
do so. Because the conditions surrounding the two sets of traffic were prac-
tically identical, and an enormous amount of business depended upon the main-
tenance of the existing relationships, this order was sustained by the Supreme
Court over the state's objection that it was necessary to consider separately
the cost and reasonableness of the state and interstate business. - 0 Similarly
in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Te.as and NVTc-w Orleans Railroad
Co.30 a separate charge for train ferrying across the Mississippi, imposed by
the Interstate Commerce Commission alike on interstate and intrastate rates
on road materials, was upheld, though no separate findings of cost were made.
Thus far, however, this doctrine has only been applied to situations where the
state and interstate transportation conditions are in fact substantially alike3 1
-All the threads that have been separately discussed thus far are to be found
drawn together in Ohio v. United States,32 a case that cuts across the categories
that have been suggested and poses the basic issues of rate policy in a time
of depression. The case arose as the latest phase of a controversy that has
persisted since at least 1909 between the soft-coal operators of the northern
and southern Appalachian coal fields, comprising Ohio and western Pennsyl-
29. The court also rejected an argument, based upon its decision in the Hoch-Smith
Grain case, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 243 (1932),
that since the evidence upon which the Commission's decision restcd related to conditions
as they stood in 1926-27, it was not adequate to support an order in 1934.
30. 284 U. S. 125 (1931), aff'g 41 F. (2d) 293 (E. D. La. 1930), and su-taining 158
I. C. C. 247 (1929) and 157 id. at 493 (1929). The Court likewise brushed aside a con-
tention that the ferrying charge amounted to a port preference forbidden by the Consti-
tution in Art. I, sec. 9, par. 6, as it had done with a similar argument in Texas and Pacific
Ry. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627 (1933). See Comment (1933) 43 YAm L. J.
297, 305.
31. A decision by the District Court sustaining the Commission in the first Florida
Log case, Florida v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 580 (N. D. Ga. 1929) on the sole ground
that the Florida intrastate rates discriminated against "general" interstate commerce, was
reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal in that case. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S.
194 (1931). This was in line with a previous decision in Arkansas Railroad Commi---on
v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rr. Co., 274 U. S. 597 (1927), in holding that except
as to revenue cases the Transportation Act had not removed the neces.ity of prov.ing
actual discrimination. The authority of the decision in the well-known Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913), to the effect that until there is a finding of discrimination by
the Interstate Commerce Commission the state retains its power over intrastate rates,
stands therefore unimpaired by the Transportation Act. Board of Railroad Commk-oners
of North Dakota v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 231 U. S. 412 (1930).
32. 292 U. S. 498 (1934), affg 6 F. Supp. 386 (S. D. Ohio 1934). On Oct. 8, 1934
the Supreme Court granted a rehearing and reargument, set for Nov. 5, 1934, in this case,
limited to so much of the Commission's order as restored the rate of $1.76 per ton on
coal from the Cambridge district to Mansfield, both in Ohio. U. S. L. Week, Oct. 9, 1934,
at 11, col. 3. This subordinate question, however, does not affect the major issues already
decided by the Court.
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vania on the one hand and West Virginia and eastern Kentucky and Tennessee
on the other. In the past the controversy has centered mainly around the
differential rates on coal from these origin territories to the ports on Lake
Erie for transshipment by water to northwestern destinations, the so-called lake-
cargo rates. 33 Since the end of the last century, when western Pennsylvania
and Ohio enjoyed an almost complete dominance of the principal industrial
coal consuming markets east of Chicago, the trend of production tonnage has
been on the whole steadily southward. Among the various factors that have
contributed to this end, such as labor costs, unionization, taxes, coal geology,
mechanization of mines, exhaustion of favorable deposits, quality of coal, and
aggressive marketing, freight rates have always been a particular grievance
to the northern operators. The rates to the southern field were originally put
in at a low level, only a few cents a ton more than the rates from the northern
fields though the distances were nearly twice as great, to allow southern operators
to compete in the same markets. With an increasing volume of traffic the
southern carriers have prospered and the relations between these operators
and their carriers have been on the whole cordial.3 4  By contrast the northern
operators have been unable to get any concessions from their carriers, and
their rates have repeatedly been fixed at maximum reasonable levels.83 Since
1914 the entire coal rate level has been raised nearly 100%, while the differ.
entials, which fix the competitive margin, have been little altered. Faced with
declining business and hampered with internecine competition, the northern
operators have been obliged to rely increasingly on the industrial markets
nearest to them. On numerous occasions they have sought relief from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, but with only minor success. 30 In view of the effect
of the depression and the refusal of the Commission in 1930 to increase the differ-
ential spread, the Ohio state commission (influenced no doubt by the plight
of coal operators and miners in the state) in 1932 ordered a substantial decrease
in the intrastate rates from two eastern Ohio districts to consuming points
nearby. The Wheeling and Lake Erie Railway, a relatively small and inde-
pendent road, anxious for traffic, asked for and obtained permission to extend
reductions to all the main consuming centers from Youngstown to Cleveland.
Thus a part of the northern rates were substantially reduced. The principal
33. For the details of this controversy see MAxSmLD, THE LAXE CARGO Cor RATE
CoNtovEzsy (1932) cc. 3-5.
34. See Lake Cargo Coal from Kentucky, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928).
35. Boileau v. Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Rr. Co., 22 I. C. C. 640 (1912); Ohio-Michigan
Coal Cases, 80 I. C. C. 663 (1923); Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 101 I. C. C. 513 (1925);
Eastern Bituminous Coal Investigation, 140 I. C. C. 3 (1928); Lake Cargo Coal Cases,
1930, 181 I. C. C. 37 (1932).
36. See Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 46 I. C. C. 159 (1917); Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925,
126 I. C. C. 309 (1927).
37. Majority control of the Wheeling, a former Rockefeller property, lies with its trunk
line competitors, the Baltimore and Ohio, New York Central, and Chesapeake and Ohio,
but it cannot be exercised under the terms of a trust agreement executed after the Inter-
state Commerce Commission refused to approve the legality of the acquisition. See Inter-
locking Directors of Wheeling and Lake Erie and Trunk Lines, 138 I. C. C. 643 (1928).
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trunk lines, after unsuccessfully resisting these charges before the Ohio Com-
mission, were obliged to make competitive reductions. Finally, the Pittsburgh
and West Virginia Railroad, another independent line, made similar reductions
from Pittsburgh. At this point, with a further spread of the reductions impend-
ing, the Interstate Commerce Commission was brought in by complaints of
the trunk lines under Section 13 and of the Pennsylvania and West Virginia
operators under Section 3. The Commission decided in favor of the trunk
lines and ordered the original rates restored, on a finding of discrimination
between localities. 38
It will be seen that the case as stated does not directly raise the familiar
issue of discrimination between the northern and southern coal fields, but
rather between two sections of the northern field, one involving mainly intra-
state rates in Ohio, and the other the interstate rates between western Penn-
sylvania and northeastern Ohio. The larger issue was not far in the back-
ground, however. If the Ohio reductions should be sustained, western Penn-
sylvania operators would have a very strong case for a similar interstate
reduction, thus restoring the small differential between them to its previous
size.39 No serious contention had been raised over the adequacy and justice of
this differential for many years. In fact, if the Pennsylvania operators had
been able and willing to stand the immediate competitive losses entailed by
the Ohio reductions, and had supported instead of opposed them, it might
ultimately have worked out considerably to their advantage. For the result
then would be a substantial widening of the differential between the northern
fields as a whole and their southern competitors, from whom in the long run
they have most to fear. The outcome of such an action could not confidently
be predicted, but it would surely precipitate a bitter renewal of the political
and legal controversies that flared up in 1927-28 around the Lake Cargo rate
decisions at that time.40 The southern operators and carriers might be expected
to oppose before the Commission the extension of the northern reductions to
Pennsylvania, and to appeal to the courts if necessary. If this line of attack
proved unsuccessful, the southern carriers might offer reductions in their rates
equal to those from the northern fields, thus restoring the differential structure
all around at the expense of general revenue losses to all the carriers. The
principal southern roads, the Chesapeake and Ohio and the Norfolk and West-
ern, have been consistent money makers and are better fortified than most to
engage in such rate competition. Such an offer would certainly provoke litigation
before the Commission similar to Lake Cargo Coal from Kentucky.41 Another
38. Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal within Ohio, 192 I. C. C. 413 (1933).
39. See Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. (1927).
40. See MANsrEW, THE LA=x CAo CoA.L RATr CoN-mo%,.vmsy (1932) cc. 5, 6. In
fact in one of the cases here consolidated and decided by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, interstate shippers in Pennsylvania, Maryland and West Arginia raised the Lssue
of the reasonableness of the interstate rates to the Ohio destinations under Section 1 of
the Act, but the Commi ion ruled against them. See Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal
Within State of Ohio, 192 I. C. C. 413, 451 (1933); Ohio v. United States, 292 U. S. 493,
503 (1934).
41. 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928).
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possibility is that the carriers might get together and work out a new and less
drastic readjustment of the differentials as a compromise which would better
protect their revenues. In any event, the Pennsylvania operators, whether be-
cause of the uncertainty of the outcome or because of inability to suffer the
temporary losses, decided to oppose the Ohio reductions. Thus the issue of
discrimination in this case was confined to the question whether the hitherto
small differential between Ohio and Pennsylvania should be suddenly magni-
fied; the larger issue of discrimination between North and South was withheld
pending the outcome of this first decision.
It is clear that a discrimination case could be made out of the disparity
between the reduced intrastate rates from eastern Ohio points and the un-
changed interstate rates from western Pennsylvania, if the latter could be shown
to be reasonable, since no attempt was made to change all Ohio rates. Further-
more, it could be argued that the necessity of reducing the interstate rates to
a competitive level with the intrastate rates cast an undue burden on the reve-
nues of the interstate carriers, and thus a revenue case would result. There
is the final possibility, that since the state and interstate rates here con-
sidered were part of a single rate structure under which the interstate com-
merce had developed, to change the intrastate portion of this structure would in
itself be an "unjust discrimination" against interstate commerce, of the third
type discussed above. With all these elements to consider, the exact reason for
the Commission's decision is not clear. The stated reason was a finding of
discrimination between localities. But the Commission did not actually thus
confine its attention. It viewed with alarm the revenue effect of the reductions,
although it made no specific findings on this subject. Moreover, the language
of the report indicates an unwillingness to disturb one part of the "closely woven
relationship of these rates under which the industry of this territory has been
fostered... [In view of] the present economic condition which also has affected
the railroads adversely, only the most convincing evidence would warrant a
disruption of the long existing relationship of rates ... 42
In his dissent from this decision,43 Commissioner Eastman, who had in
previous cases consistently advocated lower rates from the northern coal fields,
demonstrated that at least as convincing an argument could be drawn from
the same material in support of an opposite conclusion. He protested that the
majority had placed the burden of proving the unreasonableness of the inter-
state rates upon Ohio, contrary to the previous practice which laid that burden
on the interstate complainants, and indicated his belief that in the light of
present conditions the interstate rates from the northern fields were probably
unreasonably high. He contended, moreover, that since the intrastate road
was apparently deriving adequate revenue from the lowered rates, and since
the results of a decrease in interstate rates was largely a matter of guesswork,
particularly now, the revenue effects of a general reduction were not conclusively
discriminatory and were at least worth trying. Nor was he willing to admit
42. See Intrastate Rates on Bituminous Coal within Ohio, 192 I. C. C. 413, 450 (1933).
43. Id. at 455.
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that a change in the Ohio state rates would necessarily result in discrimination
against the interstate commerce that the present structure had fostered.
On appeal 32 the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the three-judge
District Court that evidence of discrimination between localities existed, and
that it was therefore unnecessary to consider the revenue aspect. Ohio's con-
tention that since her coal producers had been gradually excluded from every
market but the nearest, she was entitled to give them the lowest possible
reasonable rates to that market, was thus overruled for the sake of uniformity
and carrier revenues. Since any judgment on this controversy is a matter of
discretion and the weighing of relative values, no quarrel can be raised with
the Court's refusal to intervene. To do so would imperil hard-fought gain5
for the exercise of administrative discretion unhampered by judicial review.
It is a little less easy to understand why the Commission should have been
so unwilling to experiment, for a temporary period at least, in a situation ad-
mittedly desperate for all parties concerned. This it could have done by
reviewing the interstate rates from the Pennsylvania fields to determine whether,
in the light of present conditions, they might not reasonably be lowered. With
a lowered interstate rate the prejudice here complained of might then be non-
existent, or might be removed by a very minor increase in the Ohio rates.
But perhaps the Commission too is simply pursuing a judicial attitude in allow-
ing the trunk line railroads to exercise their discretion, and is content to sup-
port the policy adopted by the major units in the industry. As has been said,
a further test of that attitude will be afforded in Increase of Freight Charges,
1934, now pending. But it seems evident that the policy of maintaining high
rates in the face of declining traffic and advancing motor competition can not
be followed indefinitely and can only be justified by a speedy return to the
carloading figures of more prosperous times. In the meantime, local experi-
ments in reduced rates, limited in time if desired, offer the only practicable
alternative. These in turn can be fairly tried only if the Commission is will-
ing to allow more leeway to local regulatory authorities than it seems at pres-
ent inclined to do.
H. C. M.
44. Cf. Diclinso, ADmnasATmv JusicE mm r= SurnmIAcy or Lv., (1927);
McFARrmm, JiDICIAL CONTROL OF ME FEDERAL TRADE Co~msIo0 AnD Tim IrsmT
COamr RmcE CouzassioN, 1920-1930 (1930).
1934]
